

**THE DIPLOMATIC POTENTIAL OF CANADA:  
SOFT POWER IN DECLINE?**

by

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# Chapter One: General Introduction

## 1.1 Background

The degree of resilient alliances that Canada has preserved for over a century indicates Canada inherently has the potential to participate vigorously with its international counterparts. Canada's sovereign existence is attributed to its use of soft power. The term soft power, as first coined by Joseph Nye, is the ability to influence through dialogue and exchange (Nye, 1990).

Going back to its very foundation, Canada was an excellent exemplar of soft power. Meanwhile, the US was an early and ready practitioner of the exercise of hard power. The Canadian social welfare state has exemplified a model of perpetual peace with the creation of its Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Kant, 1970; Government of Canada, n.d). Canada played an important role in the formation of many international institutions to enhance multilateral collaboration amongst other countries, which attributed to Canada's diplomatic potential and marked the beginning of strong Canadian soft power. The establishment of these institutions, such as the United Nations (UN), has allowed Canada to be a leading participant in UN sanctioned peacekeeping operations in the Pacific; the Middle-East; Africa; Europe; and in the Americas.

Both of Canada's major political parties, the Liberal Party of Canada and the Conservative Party of Canada, have a track-record of being adept at advancing UN resolutions for peacekeeping and international human rights initiatives while in government. In 1956, Minister of External Affairs, Lester Pearson identified the need for an impartial, and multinational military force. Pearson, under the Louis St. Laurent Liberal government, set up an emergency UN force to defuse the Suez Canal Crisis. Due to the success of this initiative, Pearson was rewarded with the 1957 Nobel Peace Prize. Following the St. Laurent government, a Conservative government, under Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, resisted the placement of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil during the height of the US and Soviet Union nuclear arms race (Lentner, 1976). Today, Canada can possess nuclear weapons, but has chosen not to. Canada is member of every international disarmament organization committed to pursuing an end to nuclear weapons. More recently, Canada has provided effective leadership to the world through leading the charge in banning land mines from fields of conflict with the Ottawa 1997 Land Mines Treaty (Axworthy, 1997).

Historically, Canadian foreign policy demonstrates a stronger focus on multilateral engagement juxtaposed with the US. Many Canadian led initiatives were pursued without support from the US. However, both countries have worked cooperatively in one form or another, even when their policy direction has conflicted. The continued strength of the US economy and military is very important to Canada's self-interest for two reasons. Firstly, the US is the undisputable number one trading partner of Canada. Canada's resource-based economy has a strong reliance on exports to the US, which intrinsically connects Canada's economic performance with the US.

Secondly, Canada's military and defence capabilities are becoming increasingly interconnected with those of the US.

It is in Canada's best interest for their closest ally to retain the world's leading military power. Over time, Canada has minimally invested in defence spending, causing partial dependency on the US for the security of North America. The immediate years following World War Two (WW2), when Canada became a leading participant in UN-led peacekeeping missions, it was recognized as a middle-power, or honest broker. Since then, Canada's interoperability with the US has expanded. Canada cannot unequivocally acquiesce to US defence policy decisions that may compromise its soft power potential, nor can it distance itself entirely from the invaluable hard power of the US.

## **1.2 Scope of the Study**

Canada's historic influence and international contribution continue to be of salient relevance, and whether its soft power has been compromised by increasingly aligning their foreign policy with the US will be explored. To analyse the strength of Canadian soft power and the ability to use soft power to influence other countries, there is a need to first review the significance of Canada's historic alliances, followed by Canada's current role in diplomacy and development, and lastly the impact of transitioning towards interoperability with the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The utilization of soft power is based on world public opinion of Canada's position and therefore a qualitative assessment will be used to understand US-Canada policy alignment since the end of WW2. To gain a holistic understanding of soft power, this thesis will include a review of Canada's hard power capacity of its military expenditure trends by analysing the % of GDP spending. This will help to reveal the relative scale of Canada's military compared to other NATO countries and whether Canada's defence capacity is commensurate with its current international policy.

## **1.3 Definition of Key Term – Soft Power**

The concept of 'soft power' is important to define contextually as it relates to Canada. According to Nye, soft power is the ability to attract another state actor to their side indirectly without holding the high cards of military strength or economic power. Power is "the ability to effect the outcomes you want and, if necessary, change the behaviour of others to make this happen" (Nye, 2010, p. 548). Instead of focusing solely on military force and economic strength, soft power is an alternative method of wielding influence with respect to international relations. According to Nye, there are four currencies of soft power – culture, values, institutions, and past behaviour. The utilization of these currencies incubates co-opting rather than coercing, while leveraging successes to ensure the intended outcome is achieved (Nye, 2010). Based on Nye's

presentation of soft power strength, the following analysis describes Canada's culture; values; institutions; and past behaviour.

First, Canada is a country of First Nations aboriginals, and immigrants, thus its culture is becoming increasingly pluralistic. It is a country that has ingrained the principle of multiculturalism in its constitution. There is a wide range of community compilations of many large diverse cultures. Because of the increasing influence of different cultures, Canada has become more open in its domestic policy formation to different backgrounds. A great pluralistic presence has been part of Canadian culture. This translates into credibility when engaging in diplomatic dialogue and identifying common interest with other countries in the world.

Secondly, the values that Canada shares are closely aligned with principles developed for international institutions. Values that are collectively important to Canada include: multilateralism; human security; nation building; democracy; pluralism; and diplomacy. These are values other countries are attracted to and this, in part, has led to the replication of Canadian values throughout the world. Understanding and educating the world of these values is a critical part of impressing on the world a soft power that has the ability to attract and entice emulation.

Thirdly, Canada has many institutions based on the Westminster model, including the justice system, parliamentary government, public education, public health care, a social safety net, and through the repatriation of the constitution in 1981, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. They developed this constitution through use of soft power, and attained the necessary signature from the Queen of the United Kingdom (UK). All of these institutions are important and valuable to help persuade other countries to shape their own institutions.

Lastly, Canada's past behaviour is the currency which enables its use of soft power. Nye characterizes Canada, along with the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian states, for having higher political clout than their military and economic weight (Nye, 2002). He highlights the past behaviour of Canada through soft power by identifying the incorporation of the attractive cause of humanitarian aid and peacekeeping into the definition of Canadian national interest. The participation of peacekeeping missions, along with foreign aid to other countries, is therefore a necessary metric of Canadian soft power strength according to Nye. This invaluable currency will be studied exhaustively throughout this thesis to determine if Canada's behaviour trend is shifting away from characteristics associated with soft power.

Goldsmith and Horiuchi (2012) take a more in-depth look at the importance of public opinion on the currency of past behaviour. The effectiveness of a country's soft power hinges on the targeted country's public attitudes toward the country wielding, or attempting to wield, international influence (Goldsmith and Horiuchi, 2012). If country A, has strong links and is interoperating with country B, country A has to pay careful attention to the public opinion of

country B because it can negatively impact their diplomatic potential. Results from the analysis of Goldsmith and Horiuchi (2012) reveal public opinion of US foreign policy in foreign countries does affect those particular countries policies towards the US. Goldsmith and Horiuchi (2012) expand on Nye's focus on the affinity the outside world has for US culture, and highlight a larger importance of the public opinion on foreign policy decisions. Therefore, Canada must be mindful when engaging in US-led missions because of the impact it has on their ability to engage diplomatically. This is perhaps the most important intangible aspect of soft power.

## **1.4 Research Problem**

Canada-US relations are shaped by a shared history and geography, identity as western liberal democracies, and shared interests in North American economic integration and national security. Canada is often depicted in terms of its acceptance and, or rejection of US foreign policy, which falls short of a full analysis of Canada's soft power. Instead of trying to prove whether Canada supports or rejects US foreign policy objectives, this thesis will evaluate individual foreign policy decisions along with their corresponding impact on Canada's soft power. What is already clearly established by scholars, such as Lerhe, Middlemiss and Stairs, is the high level of integration with the US. A clear example of Canada opposing a US policy decision, and still enabling US policy objectives, is the rejection of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) by the Progressive Conservative government under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, while simultaneously permitting the US Air Force further access to bases in the north. Another example is the rejection by the Liberal government, under Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, which withstood US pressure to join the 'coalition of the willing' in the Iraq War (2003), while simultaneously mobilizing the Canadian Navy in a defence capacity.

The Canadian government's unwillingness to fund a robust independent military is a direct cause of military cooperation with the US. As Middlemiss and Stairs (2002) conclude, interoperating with the US is "the only game in town" for Canada. Although some have mused of Canadian sovereignty being at risk, Lerhe's study demonstrates that "both interoperability and almost all aspects of military cooperation with the US have very limited sovereignty impact" (Lerhe, 2012, p. 387). This study will focus narrowly on what the evolution of enhanced interoperability means for Canada's diplomatic future. It will also attempt to discern how the perception of Canada's actions impact the strength of Canadian soft power. Furthermore, it will consider whether ideological views from different political parties impact policy outcomes. Lastly, it will reveal what Canada's role has been and what its potential is in international regions of conflict.

## **1.5 Research Questions**

1. Is Canada's military interoperability with the US adversely impacting Canada's ability to engage in diplomacy?

2. Is Canada's reliance on the US to perform robust military operations consequential to the potential utilization of Canadian soft power?

## **1.6 Hypothesis**

Canada ought to set out specific, ambitious, and measurable goals by leveraging past international accomplishments to engage in meaningful diplomacy with conflict regions in the world. However, with Canada's increasing dependence on support from the US, due to decreasing funding in defence budgets, the potential utilization of Canadian soft power has declined.

It is expected that the degree of Canadian participation with US foreign policy will impact the behaviour of other countries towards Canada. Ultimately, it is expected that Canadian soft power will be weakened as their foreign policy becomes less heterogeneous, less focused on peacekeeping and consensus building, and more concentrated on extensive conventional military operations alongside the US.

## **1.7 Methodology**

The method of this study will use exploratory research. Exploratory research aims to gain familiarity with or to achieve new insights into a phenomenon, often in order to formulate a more precise research question or to develop a hypothesis (Atchison & Palys, 2003). This method will be used to better understand Canada's current relationship with other countries and analyse its historic participation in international diplomacy and development. This method will also be used to understand trends in Canadian defence spending.

Descriptive research will also be used in exploring the subject. Descriptive research aims to accurately portray the characteristics of a particular individual, situation, group, sample, or population, and/or to describe processes that operate within a particular milieu (Atchison & Palys, 2003). This method of research will attempt to describe the characteristics of different Canadian government administrations, Prime Ministers, and External Affairs Ministers during specific time periods, focusing on post-WW2, with a bigger focus post September 11<sup>th</sup> (9/11).

Lastly, explanatory research will be used to connect ideas to understand cause and effect. More specifically, it will look at the Canadian participation in international affairs, with and without the US, to measure Canada's future capacity to influence regions in the world currently experiencing the most egregious challenges.

### **1.7.1 Data Collection and Analysis**

Throughout this research different research tools will be used which include; existing interviews and memoirs from former Canadian PM's, the Portland Communications Soft Power 30 Study, UN peacekeeping statistics, defence spending statistics and document analysis of literature. A formal qualitative interview with the Chair of Political Science at the University of Prince Edward

Island, Dr. Peter McKenna, will be used to provide a perspective from a Canadian policy expert in international politics (Appendix A).

Once the data is collected from the memoirs, interviews and literature, it will further be analysed. To complete the analysis, any consequences on the research question from the data will inform the thesis. After the data is analysed, conclusions will be made based on practical trends.



## **Chapter Two: Canada's Diplomatic –Soft Power Potential**

Canada has formed multilateral alliances based on many factors, such as history, self-interest and geographic circumstances. The partnership between Francophones and Anglophones during the formation of Canada's colonial heritage evolved into an international relationship amongst the various countries that continue to be members of La Francophonie and the Commonwealth. There are several other international organizations Canada naturally became members of, however the most important, from a defence perspective, was the creation of NATO. The three organizations are identified and described in the following sections to assess potential soft power persuasiveness in an international context.

Soft power potential will be analyzed directly with the significant events that implicate Canada with US foreign policy; the relativity of Canada's history of diplomacy and development; a cursory hard power measurement; and its significant achievement of being an integral part of the concept of UN peacekeeping.

### **2.1 La Francophonie**

The residual impact of the unravelling of the French empire led to the prevalence of the French language. French is still one of the most common languages in the former French colonies and many have institutions that were developed by France, particularly in Africa. L'Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (La Francophonie) is the international arrangement that governs relations between fifty-seven member states and governments, three associate members and twenty observers. The membership follows the following mandate (Francophonie, n.d):

1. Promoting French language and cultural and linguistic diversity.
2. Promoting peace, democracy and human rights.
3. Supporting education, training, higher education and scientific research.
4. Expanding cooperation for sustainable development

Canada is a founding member of the La Francophonie, and an active participant. Michaëlle Jean is the current secretary general, a Haitian born Canadian and former Governor-General of Canada. The principles and ideals of the institution, which has many operating agencies and partner organizations, align with Canadian ideals. The first secretary general of the original organization, Agence de coopération culturelle et technique (ACCT) was also a Canadian, Jean-Marc Léger. Another Canadian, Jean-Louis Roy, was secretary of the ACCT from 1989 until the formal creation of the Agence intergouvernementale de la Francophonie in 1997.

At a time when a Francophonie country in the western hemisphere needed help, Canada acted. Canada's role in the French country of Haiti stood out from the other countries who participated in the UN-led mission. The operation brought an end to the military coup that ousted

the country's democratically elected government in 1991 and ensured the return of President Aristide in accordance with the Governor's Island Agreement. The UN mission, authorized by the Security Council, formally took over in March of 1995 from a US-led multinational force. In February of 1996 the Security Council approved a final four-month extension of the UN's mandate, at a reduced strength of 1,200 military personnel and 300 civilian police. Canada provided 700 troops at its own expense and took the lead of commanding a US force at the end of March. Prime Minister Chrétien eludes to the important Francophonie affiliation in his memoirs, along with the large Haitian communities in Canada as reasons why Canada felt compelled to participate. More suggestively was his assertion that Canada was perceived by the Caribbean states as neutral peacekeepers rather than imperialist invaders (Chrétien, 2010). Canada did not participate in the first phase of the operation, which was concentrated at deposing the dictator. Canada's interest was in the reconstruction effort, including the training of new security personnel.

Prime Minister Paul Martin continued in this spirit, recognizing that "as the hemisphere's largest francophone nation, [he] said we should consider special responsibilities in Haiti" (Martin, 2009, p. 330). The importance of protecting human security concerns in countries with common links are concrete examples of Canada's strong global reach and trusted esteem. The example of this particular international intergovernmental organization is one of many Canada has been involved with from the start. Canada actively participates with other affiliated institutions, such as the consultative body called Parliamentary Assembly of the Francophonie (APF). This organization includes a membership of parliamentarians across Canada representing individual provinces, along with individual countries all over the world divided into four regions: America; Africa; Asia; and Europe. The current Chair of the international association is a Canadian Conservative Senator, Paul McIntyre of the province of New Brunswick.

Canada can continue to gain advantages from its alliance with France. France ranks one spot higher than Canada in the overall 'soft power 30' rankings and continues to hold membership in more multilateral organizations than any other country. The notable soft power strengths of France include having the second largest network of Embassies in the world (behind the US) and tremendous cultural promotion power in its Alliance Francaise centres. Many still recognize French as being the 'language of diplomacy' in the world (Portland Communications, 2015).

## **2.2 The Commonwealth**

The Commonwealth is an intergovernmental organization of fifty-three member states, mostly comprised of territories of the former British Empire. Its organization promotes democracy, human rights and the rule of law - all essential institutional values for utilizing soft power. The historical contribution Canada made to the evolution of the Commonwealth can be traced back to when a senior Canadian diplomat, Arnold Smith, was named as the first secretary general. From what began in 1907 as a Colonial Conference occurring every four years, with the

Prime Minister of the United Kingdom as the ex-officio President, the group incrementally evolved into the 'British Commonwealth', and finally a more equal 'Commonwealth' in 1948 extending to new independent republics, such as Pakistan and India.

Confederation in Canada was officially born in 1867 with the British North America Act (BNA Act). Canada remained part of the Commonwealth, with many of the changes occurring at a more local level. Canada's external representation was conducted according to the British interests out of the High Commission in London up until 1931 with the adoption of the Statute of Westminster. Canada's closest military partner up until 1938 was the UK with little effort on close military collaboration with the US.

Until the administration of President Franklin Delenaor Roosevelt, the US did not openly state the interest of protecting an attack against Canada. The rising power of both Germany and Japan in the 1930's was of particular concern to the US and Canada, creating a shared interest of keeping imperial powers from entering North America. WW2 began the most significant shift for Canada towards full autonomy of its foreign affairs. With this autonomy came the beginning of unprecedented military cooperation in terms of data sharing and intelligence with the UK, other Commonwealth countries, and the US. The mechanism used for the intelligence sharing is called the Combined Communications-Electronic Board, which is still used today (Lerhe, 2012). In 1940, the creation of the Permanent Joint Board of Defence (PJBD) and the 1941 Hyde Park declaration provided the framework of joint defence production for Canada and the US (Lerhe, 2012). As WW2 drew to an end in 1944, Prime Minister William Lyon McKenzie King called for, and was able to attain Canadian representation for the first time as a nation-state in the countries of India, Cuba and Peru (Macadam, 1944). After WW2, Canada forgave the war debt accumulated by its former colonial master and provided a substantial loan for the UK to rebuild itself. Canada was in a much more balanced position of power, newly independent, and more assured of its defence system.

The Commonwealth, with a new name since 1948, still remained under the firm control of the UK. It wasn't until the late 1960's, into the 1970's where the Commonwealth actually met outside of the UK and some of the members were able to exert more equal influence with the group. During the highly destabilizing civil war in Nigeria in 1968, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau appointed a special emissary, Ivan Head, to engage the Nigerian government. Head met with General Gowon in October 1968, and then visited Africa on two more occasions speaking frequently to the special emissary to Nigeria from the US (Head & Trudeau, 1995). Finally, the end of hostilities in January of 1970 allowed for a Commonwealth observer-force, including Canadian Gen. William Milroy, to visit the front-lines.

Head continued to play an active role in engaging African countries for Prime Minister Trudeau within the Commonwealth. A contentious issue for African countries to address with

urgency was the UK's involvement in providing the South African government with arms, turning a blind-eye towards apartheid and racist government policy. This prompted the African countries to threaten to leave the Commonwealth on moral grounds. Head visited these countries to communicate that Canada would support their cause if they agreed to participate at the next Commonwealth meeting in Singapore. Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, acting as the African spokesman on these issues presented a 'Declaration of Principles' to be presented to the Commonwealth for Head to consider Canada's endorsement (Head & Trudeau, 1995). Canada endorsed this document and Prime Minister Trudeau himself let the Prime Minister of the UK know that they expected the UK to follow-through on these principles. It was the diplomatic efforts of Canada that convinced the African countries to attend the next Commonwealth Conference. While closing the Conference where the 'Declaration of Commonwealth Principles' were adopted, Chairman Lee recognized only Prime Minister Trudeau for his outstanding contribution (Head & Trudeau, 1995).

Whenever tension between the UK and African countries arose, Canada played an instrumental role as an honest broker. Tanzania went so far as to withdraw its high commissioner from the UK and requested Canada to undertake the traditional diplomatic task of acting as a 'protective power' of Tanzanian interests in Britain. Simultaneously, Britain asked Canada to become the protective power of its interests in Tanzania. Effectively, Canada was acting as a trusted unbiased middle-power, representing the UK to Tanzania and Tanzania to the UK (Head & Trudeau, 1995).

Canada, under PM Trudeau, pursued the issue of governance practices at the first conference they hosted at the 1973 meeting in Ottawa. In preparation for this important discussion, Prime Minister Trudeau felt it important to engage each member state so he asked Head to travel to each of the thirty-one Commonwealth capitals to gather information on all positions. For Prime Minister Trudeau, and the Canadian government, the value of the Commonwealth was its emphasis on informal discussions and not having an overarching specific goal. Trudeau (1995) said the following:

I am not at this meeting in search of a new role for the Commonwealth, or indeed of any role. The Commonwealth is for many of its members a special window on the world. Over the years its importance will grow largely because it has no specific role, but emphasizes instead the value of the human relationship. (p. 119)

Beginning in 1985, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney began to use the Commonwealth more pointedly to collectively impose sanctions on the South African government with the objective of ending apartheid and releasing Nelson Mandela from prison. The UK, under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and the US, under President Ronald Regan were opposed to imposing these sanctions driven mostly by economic and trading interests with South Africa. Mulroney, along with

his External Affairs Minister, Joe Clark, continued to impose even more sanctions against the wishes of the UK. Mulroney eluded to his abhorrence of the apartheid system: “I was resolved from the moment I became prime minister that any government I headed would speak and act in the finest traditions of Canada” (Kennedy, 2013). After an August 1986 meeting in London with Canada and other Commonwealth countries on one-side and the UK on the opposing side, more sanctions were imposed. Ultimately the sanctions worked and by 1990 Mandela was released from jail and chose Canada as his first place to deliver a speech in a legislature. Mulroney went on to announce the establishment of a \$5 million fund to help relocate South African exiles.

In the Portland communications Soft Power 30 rankings (2015), the UK scores highest overall with the highest soft power strength. Much of this is attributed to its strong institutions and membership in key multilateral organizations. Maintaining close relations and being an active member in the Commonwealth organization will continue to be of benefit to Canadian soft power. Further complementing the UK’s multilateral clout, and therefore the Commonwealth itself is its ability to maintain strong positions in the G7, UN Security Council, the European Union, and NATO.

## **2.3 NATO**

NATO was formed during the era when Canada was in the best position to insert global influence. Canada was a founding member heavily focused on pursuing its vision of a fair and stable international community. Canada helped draft the North Atlantic Charter creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, more commonly known as NATO (1949). The most well-known contribution was Article 2 which committed members to maintaining a free political system and to promoting economic cooperation, in addition to the military alliance. It was the first military pact into which Canada had entered in peacetime.

NATO consists of 28 member states from Europe and North America. One of the reasons an arrangement of these states was formed during the Cold War, was deterrence against the Soviet Empire, or communist bloc. Prime Minister St Laurent and Pearson, then Minister, were also cognizant of potential European rivalries and saw NATO as an opportunity to prevent another world war or hegemonic competition amongst the rivalries in Europe. Starting in 1951, Canadian soldiers were deployed in Europe under NATO. NATO’s military component is made up of mostly US forces, however it does have European headquarters in the Netherlands and in Naples. Beyond its member states it has been common for NATO to work with global partners. In the bombing campaign of Libya, for example, Qatar and Saudi Arabia were involved in giving aircraft assistance to NATO.

NATO is not a humanitarian institution. When it enters into a conflict it is not responsible for anything beyond preventing large scale massacres on civilians. It is not the body that can

legitimately engage in meaningful diplomacy because its purpose is the security of its member states. NATO's fundamental purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members through political and military means. It has a non-binding target for its member states to spend a minimum of 2% of its GDP on defence and military. Besides the US, only France, Greece, Estonia, Turkey and the UK spend at least that percentage of GDP. The UK has recently signalled, even during challenging fiscal times, that it will continue to adhere to the 2% target (Sedghi, 2015). Canada, spending roughly 1% of its GDP on defence, is well below the target of that spending threshold however is recognized as an important ally and participant (World Bank, 2015).

Canada remains committed to NATO and hosts an international security forum in Halifax annually, since 2009, where NATO is a partner and many of its member countries in attendance. Canada's commitment to NATO is consistent with its multilateral preference of engagement but NATO missions are not always sanctioned by the UN. Generally, NATO strives to act through a UN Security Council resolution, but there have been exceptions since the 1990's. The first recognized example being the bombing of Serbia in 1999. It was the position of both the US and Canada that NATO had to act promptly following the breakup of Yugoslavia to halt the aggression against Albanians who were being killed in Kosovo under the orders of Premier of the republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević. Canada participated in this exercise on the basis of the evidence of ethnic cleansing.

The US has significant de facto power when operating with NATO and represents the vast majority of its military personnel. Many of the US's adversaries view the actions of NATO more as US actions abroad. The US had difficulty, however, convincing its NATO allies to accept intermediate range missiles on their territory in the early 1980's. Canada has still not accepted these types of long range missiles, or broad participation on a SDI initiative. Maintaining or accelerating influence with NATO for any country including Canada, because of the strong influence of the US, is somewhat predicated on close relations with the US.

NATO, and, therefore, the US has a substantial presence on the European continent. NATO and Russia continue to be at odds with the wide spread number of US troops and military bases so close to the border of Russia. In 1997, there was a pledge to Russia not to station troops or nuclear weapons on the new NATO member states. NATO did not adhere to that pledge. Further causing tension and distrust was the decision in 1999, for NATO to extend its membership to the eastern European states considered under the 'sphere of influence' of Russia. Many of the Baltic States once part of the Soviet Union have joined NATO.

The US has become increasingly more important for Canada economically and militarily than the European Allies, precipitating a stronger direction on closer interoperability with the US alone. NATO's relevance is of less importance for Canada, regardless of its multilateral compilation. 'Strategy 2020' was the first official document that highlighted this shift (Department

of National Defence, 2006). Within the 5 year targets, objectives, attributes and competencies, the focus is not on NATO, but the US alone. Canada's role with NATO in Afghanistan is perceived in the world as a strong commitment to the US and part of the US-Canadian Alliance. The original mandate of the transatlantic link is of less importance and 'NATO', in the international arena, is becoming synonymous with the US. The outcome of this evolution means that Canada's historical preference to operate multilaterally is undermined and therefore its soft power has become less relevant while it acts bilaterally with the US.

## 2.4 Effect of Soft Power from US/Canada Alliance

The testing of the hypothesis is best completed by assessing significant events, and comparing the Canadian position with the US. To inform the thesis, the following charts seek to discover whether Canadian soft power is affected by the Prime Minister leading the government, policy alignment with the US, or US/Canada military interoperability. Strength of Canadian soft power is determined by whether or not world public opinion is favourable towards Canada's action in each case. Table 1 analyses significant events following WW2 until 9/11, with Table 2 analyzing significant events post-9/11.

**Table 1: Significant events Post-WW2**

EVENT	PRIME MINISTER	POLICY ALIGNMENT WITH US	US / CANADA MILITARY INTEROPERABILITY	EFFECT OF CANADIAN SOFT POWER LEVERAGE
<b>1949 creation of NATO</b>	Louis St Laurent	Canada and the US become charter members of NATO	Yes	Stronger (Canada helps with the multilateral design. European allies all joined, giving less independent power to US forces)
<b>1954-55 US requests Canadian military assistance</b>	Louis St Laurent	Canada denies the request	No	Stronger
<b>1958 NORAD agreement North American Aerospace</b>	John Diefenbaker	Canada accepts the request	Yes	Weaker (The agreement was rushed)

<b>Defence Command</b>				
<b>1961 Nuclear Weapons</b>	John Diefenbaker	Canada rejects the request	No	Stronger (Canada decided against possessing nuclear weapons; a positive in world opinion)
<b>1962 Cuban Missile Crises</b>	John Diefenbaker	Canada does not participate	Moderate (Canadian forces, under NOARD, went into a state of readiness)	No change (the US did not consult with Canadian leadership for their forces to be in a state of readiness)
<b>1965-73 Vietnam War</b>	Lester Pearson/Pierre Trudeau	Canada does not participate and speaks out against bombing in Vietnam	No	Stronger (world opinion was against the US-led War)
<b>1968-72 Canadian cuts to NATO in Europe</b>	Pierre Trudeau	US disagrees	No	Unknown (Less interoperability with the US and reliance on hard power, however less support from European allies)
<b>1983-84 Cruise Missile Tests</b>	Pierre Trudeau-Brian Mulroney	Canada agrees to let their territory be used	Yes	Weaker
<b>1983 Trudeau Peace Initiative</b>	Pierre Trudeau	US disagrees	No	Unknown (not apparent if exercise was able to influence either side, however peace talks started the year following)
<b>1985 SDI</b>	Brian Mulroney	Canada disagrees	No	Slightly Stronger(Canada does not participate but allows access to Northern bases)



<b>1990-91 Gulf War</b>	Brian Mulroney	Canada agrees	Yes	Unknown (Using hard power but mission was sanctioned through the UN)
<b>1996-97 Land Mine Treaty</b>	Jean Chrétien	US disagrees	No	Stronger (US could not prevent it from coming into existence)

**Table 2: Significant events Post-9/11**

<b>EVENT</b>	<b>PRIME MINISTER</b>	<b>POLICY ALIGNMENT WITH US</b>	<b>US / CANADA MILITARY INTEROPERABILITY</b>	<b>EFFECT OF CANADIAN SOFT POWER LEVERAGE</b>
<b>2001 Operation Apollo – Afghan War</b>	Jean Chrétien	Canada agrees	Yes	Weaker (Canada’s role predetermined by the US)
<b>2002 US asks for exception for its peacekeepers from International Criminal Court</b>	Jean Chrétien	Canada blocks US exception	No	Stronger (US does not get exception)
<b>2003 OIF – Iraq War</b>	Jean Chrétien	Canada disagrees	Moderate (indirect support from Navy)	Slightly Stronger (UN resolution did not pass, and Canada did not directly participate)
<b>2004-05 BMD Ballistic Missile Defence</b>	Paul Martin	Canada disagrees	No	Stronger (World public opinion was against the US)
<b>2004-06 NORAD modification</b>	Paul Martin/Stephen Harper	Canada agrees to NORAD modification	Yes	Weaker (Sharing access to missile tracking data, and expansion)

				into maritime defence)
<b>2010 UN Vote for temporary seat at the Security Council</b>	Stephen Harper	Canada lost to Germany and Portugal, marking the first time Canada sought a Security Council seat and lost	N/A	Weaker (Signal that other countries are best suited to represent their interests than Canada would at the UN)
<b>2012 UN Vote for recognition of Palestinian State</b>	Stephen Harper	Canada agrees with the US, and was one of only 9 to vote against state recognition	Yes	Weaker (Clear vote against world public opinion)
<b>2014 Ukraine-Crimea Crisis</b>	Stephen Harper	Canada pulled out its ambassador, told Russia to “get out of Ukraine”, and Harper visited Ukraine before any other Western nation	Yes	Weaker (13 Canadian parliamentarians were sanctioned by Russia, and no soft power was attempted, severing any relations with Russia)
<b>2015 Syria bombing (targeting ISIL/ISIS)</b>	Stephen Harper	Canada agrees	Yes	Weaker (No vote through the UN, and no permission given by a sovereign country)

Soft power is an intangible concept and challenging to provide metrics for, but that does not diminish the importance of assigning value to its strength. What is discovered in both Table 1 and Table 2 is military interoperability with the US does not always directly impact Canada’s soft power strength. The real vulnerability for Canadian diplomatic potential is when Canada goes beyond military interoperability with the US and presents itself as a combative military power in both prevalent conflict zones of Eastern-Europe and the Middle-East. When Canada has directly participated with the US missions that were contrary to public opinion, Canada’s soft power potential is thwarted by closing potential diplomatic channels. Table 1 reflects stronger diplomatic strength for Canada than in Table 2. Canada was more likely to work multilaterally when it was part of the US policy enactments before the events of 9/11. Post 9/11, Table 2 reveals that Canada’s

soft power weakened more frequently. The events credited as strengthening Canadian soft power during this period include the decision not to participate in Iraq and the decision to not to participate in Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD). It is observed that the past behaviour of Canada has both enhanced and decreased soft power on a case-by-case basis, which is not directly related to military interoperability.

There might be a tendency to cast Conservatives as the ‘realists’ focused on hard power, and Liberals, the ‘internationalists’, focused on soft power. However, there is no direct correlation to support that claim. Joe Clark was a Progressive Conservative Prime Minister, and served as External Affairs Minister under Brian Mulroney, the last Progressive Conservative Prime Minister<sup>1</sup>. Clark believes Canada is currently leading ‘mainly in hard power areas.’ He goes on to highlight that both Canada’s tradition and the nature of the world mean that there’s a great opportunity for us to reconcile our differences, ‘so-called soft power things’ (Clark, 2014). Clark explicitly refers to soft power, as he wrote about the need for a trusted country that can mediate others. The result of Canada losing its opportunity to become a temporary member of the Security Council, and voting among the minority countries against the concept of a Palestinian state are warning signs of losing that persuasive power in the world – the very essence of soft power.

In a 2014 interview, Prime Minister Mulroney spoke out about the Harper government’s lack of appreciation of the UN. “When Canada for the first time in our history loses a vote at the UN to become a member of the Security Council to Portugal, which was on the verge of bankruptcy at the time you should look in the mirror and say, Houston, I think we may have a problem” (The Canadian Press, 2014). The Harper government has not attributed as much value in engaging those that aren’t wholly agreeable to the Canadian government’s position. Most of the weakening of soft power outlined in Table 2 occurred under the Harper government, although some occurred under the prior Liberal government. Past Progressive Conservative Prime Minister’s Mulroney and Clark spoke candidly about how Canada should cooperate amongst other governments to pursue the kinds of Canadian led initiatives from the past. These are the same aspects Nye described as important for soft power. He pointed to Canada’s initiatives when stating “these are lessons that the unilateralists forget at their peril” (Nye, 2010, p. 553). The Canadian comparative advantage is Canada’s potential to engage cooperatively as a trusted mediator, but this ability has been weakened, not from military operability alone, but from a shift in policy decisions post-9/11.

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<sup>1</sup>The Progressive Conservative Party of Canada last held government from 1984-1993 under Brian Mulroney and later merged with the Canadian Alliance Party in December of 2003 to form The Conservative Party of Canada.

## 2.5 Diplomacy and Development post-WW2

Canada's sizable contribution in WW2 allowed for a strong place at the table to engage in diplomacy. John Holmes noted that Canada enjoyed an 'informal directorate of three', which set post-war economic arrangements, designed the NATO alliance and established the UN Atomic Energy Commission (Holmes, 1981). Throughout the Mackenzie King government (1935-48), the long serving Prime Minister shifted foreign policy intentionally away from the UK and further aligned Canada with the US. While Canada shifted its cooperation model towards the US, it took on a formal equality in security matters with the signing of PJBD, and a long list of other agreements for the defence of the North American continent.

As the Cold War progressed the St Laurent government (1948-57) began to take on a more internationalist view on the world stage (Holmes, 1981). St Laurent believed that no foreign policy is consistent nor coherent over a period of years unless it is based upon some concept of human values (Chapnick, 2007). The St Laurent government made development in poor countries a high priority, considering it a moral imperative to engage and protect vulnerable citizens of the world. Canada became a charter member of the Colombo Plan, the world's first North-South economic assistance program (Head & Trudeau, 1995).

St. Laurent further expressed his internationalist views: "continued prosperity and well-being of our own people can best be served by the prosperity and well-being of the whole world" (Chapnick, 2007). This sentiment endured during the St Laurent government throughout the term and followed into successive Canadian governments. Many recognize St Laurent's Minister of External Affairs, Pearson, as the biggest contributor to Canada's foreign policy contribution, whom is mentioned earlier in reference to his Nobel Peace Prize (Michaud, 1999). Pearson was credited as being integrally responsible for the diffusion of the Suez Canal crisis during the Cold War through a diplomatic unbiased approach to the conflict with France, the UK, and Israel on one-side with Egypt on the other<sup>2</sup>.

The divisions during the Cold War were not insurmountable for Canada to maintain diplomatic relations with those countries on the opposing Communist side. Canada recognized that support for China, and opposition to the US in some parts of the world were growing as early as 1958 (Gilley, 2011). Canada pursued multilateral relationships with IndoChina, and went as far as selling wheat to Communist China in the middle of the cold war (1961), as it was consistent with both economic and humanitarian liberal principles. They then established formal diplomatic recognition and relations in 1970, proceeding on the primacy of international law being fairly applied (Head & Trudeau, 1995). Ultimately, a 'special partnership' was formed and Canada became a popular tourist destination for China's ever-growing middle class. Since 1959, Canada has also

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<sup>2</sup> Lester Pearson went on to become Prime Minister from 1963 to 1968

embraced a policy of dialogue with Cuba, referred to as ‘constructive engagement’ which included commercial exchange. The only other country in the America’s to have maintained ties with Cuba during this period of time is Mexico.

In the 1960’s into the 1970’s there was more direction sought out to provide a major increase in Canada’s official development assistance and an enhancement of involvement in the developing countries. Trudeau’s government created the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), which was originally housed in the Department of Trade and Commerce (under St Laurent). This organization led to the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) in 1970. These programs were emulated in other countries, and were immune from budget freezing by the direction of Trudeau. Human values from each Prime Minister overtime has been a guiding principle, looking at the needs of individuals as world citizens rather than the needs of nation-states.

The principle of human security was behind the leading role Canada took during the banning of land mines in 1997, which occurred under the Chrétien government (Axworthy, 1997). Again Canada took a leading role during the movement to establish the International Criminal Court (ICC), which came into effect in 2002 (Axworthy & Taylor, 2010). In Rome in 1998, a delegation of international NGO leaders asked Canada’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, to act as a catalyst to get ICC negotiations moving again, which Canada had done earlier on the land mines treaty process (Axworthy & Taylor, 2010)<sup>3</sup>. The end result was 120 countries voting in favour with just seven against. By the end of 2002, 139 countries had officially signed on with 89 ratifying the ‘Rome Statute’ (Axworthy & Taylor, 2010). US President Clinton had signed the Rome treaty, only to be overturned by President George W. Bush, with the demands for immunity for US soldiers. In the end, Canadian leadership by Axworthy and others saved the ICC<sup>4</sup>.

The Martin government (2003-06) shifted more dollars into military, in part because it had the surplus to spend, but more evident was the events of 9/11 that changed the direction of foreign policy pressures for many western liberal democracies. Martin commissioned Canada’s first national security policy. Although military spending rose under Martin, Canada continued to pursue engagement with other major countries, particularly India and China. Martin can be credited as the Prime Minister that encouraged the expansion of the G8 group of countries to the G20, which he pursued since he was the Minister of Finance. Participating with these types of multilateral organizations has always been a method of international influence for Canada, but this arrangement was also of large economic importance.

Prime Minister Harper, shortly after his majority win in 2011, said in an interview that “...if you don’t have the capacity to act you are not taken seriously...It’s very difficult to contribute

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<sup>3</sup> The Department of External Affairs was renamed to the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1993

<sup>4</sup> The US signed bilateral deals with several countries which continue to contravene the spirit of the ICC

to solutions unless you can contribute across the range of capabilities, up to and including military capabilities” (Whyte, 2011). The Harper government shifted focus to more hard power capabilities. By doing so, Canada reduced the size of the Foreign Affairs Department and reduced funding to foreign aid for developing countries – both tenets of soft power. In 2012, the Harper government removed the ‘Understanding Canada’ program, used to promote and educate the world on Canada’s values, principles and political system. Canadian writers and intellectuals, including celebrated author Margaret Atwood, signed a public letter asking for its reinstatement. This type of international programming is at the core of utilizing soft power. Canada’s peacekeeping initiatives, its commitment to reducing trafficking in small arms, and its emphasis on children’s rights do not need to take away from having strong military capabilities (Chapnick, 2011). The capacity to act with hard power should complement a strong soft power with more global efforts on conflict prevention rather than provoking, and abandoning public diplomacy initiatives.

Believing in a strong military should not diminish Canada’s ability to showcase its strengths abroad. Senator Romeo Dallaire’s relentless campaign on ending the practice of child soldiers throughout the world is going to take skills in mobilizing like-minded groups, working within multilateral organizations, and being recognized for having strong investments in defence. When development assistance is hampered by the Harper government, however, this type of broad initiative becomes more challenging. Especially when budget decisions effectively end funding to groups such as the Canadian Council for International Cooperation, and consultations are no longer scheduled with the NGO community. It was a former Progressive Conservative Party’s initiative to hold annual human rights consultations with the NGO community, which was under Clark’s leadership in the Mulroney government (Chapnick, 2011). When national public policy partners with NGO’s over causes of this magnitude, it has proved most effective. Soft power can only be weakened with the reductions of these programs all political parties in Canada previously supported for decades.

## **2.6 Defence Spending**

Canada’s defence spending has declined since the end of WW2, as it has for many mature democracies. Defence spending is a key component of measuring hard power capacity. It is not entirely separate from soft power relative to diplomatic potential given Nye’s suggestion that a country that suffers economic and military decline is likely to lose its ability to shape the international agenda and its attractiveness (Nye, 2002). The military budget started to increase under the Martin government (2003), and then continued under the Harper government (2006). When financial measures were imposed in 2009 under the Harper government, the development assistance was cut first instead of military. This is a stark contrast to the freeze measures during the Trudeau government when development assistance was one of the only areas immune and military was frozen. Administrations do yield differences in priorities, clearly revealed in budget numbers,

but Canada's soft power potential remains and is only in part determined by the political party at the helm. The vulnerability to soft power potential under any government administration is whether it retreats from participating with international organizations, ends foreign aid, and directs future defence budgets to conventional military alone.

The following chart graphs the movement of military spending as a percentage of GDP in Canada. Defence spending began to decrease following 1951 as a percentage of GDP. The graph reveals that in the Trudeau years (1970's), while Canada began to withdraw its military presence from Europe, the percentage of GDP decreased below the 2% NATO target. This trend continued and took another significant drop to around 1% in the 1990's (World Bank, 2015). Not shown on this graph is a marginal increase since the Harper government has been in majority position (2008).




Figure 1: Military Spending as a percentage of GDP (Project Ploughshares, 2012)

With the exception of the Vietnam War era, percentage increases (and decreases) in Canadian spending have tracked US changes very closely throughout the post-war period. It is important to note that Canadian and US spending are plotted on different scales; the chart compares the relative evolution, not the absolute levels, of Canadian and US spending. The post-2001 military buildup by the US has moved US spending higher than the Canadian line.




Figure 2: US & Canadian Military Spending (Project Ploughshares, 2012).

In 2001, Canada was the sixth largest spender among the 19 members of NATO. No NATO member comes close to matching the US level of military spending, which alone accounts for roughly 40 percent of the world’s total military spending. Canadian military spending is well below that of the second-tier NATO spenders (all of which have much larger populations and economies, and two of which are Permanent Members of the Security Council). But it remains in the position it has held throughout most of the post-WW2 period: at or near the top of the third tier of military spenders. Canadian spending would have to double for Canada to reach the level of the second-tier spenders.

The graph shows that there is a significant gap between Canada and the second-tier spenders. Prime Minister Martin reflected that “through the course of many governments, including during [his] as Finance Minister, Canada’s defence capacity had been whittled away” (Martin, 2009, p. 329)<sup>5</sup>. Doubling defence spending is not something that would be politically practical in the near future. Even Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s recent increases in military are not going to be nearly enough to get close to the 2% of GDP spending the US and NATO has asked of its members.

<sup>5</sup> Paul Martin served as Finance Minister in the Jean Chrétien government from 1993 to 2003






Figure 3: NATO Military Spending 2001 (Project Ploughshares, 2012).

Soft power is a stronger focus of this study, but hard power in the form of a strong military capacity does matter for diplomatic clout and reputation. A smart power strategy requires a deeper understanding of power that combines hard and soft power resources to maintain alliances and create networks (Nye, 2010). Therefore, both hard and soft power are essential for Canada to engage in shaping, and impacting, the international agenda.

## 2.7 UN Peacekeeping

Although WW2 saw unprecedented collaboration with Canada and the US, the two countries embarked on different paths following the war. Canada, intentionally, pulled back from being recognized as a major military power, while the US began its arms race with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Canada contributed towards supporting the international institutional framework of the UN. Canada's interest was to formally create an international body that could mitigate the power of stronger countries in the Security Council. Canada emerged as a committed advocate of the UN's role as humankind's best hope to attain and maintain international security, cooperation, and peace (Michaud, 1999). Canada, being a successful federal state itself, was later instrumental in negotiating in the 'federal state clause' in the UN Convention on the Law of Treaties, in Vienna in 1969.

Canada achieved its highest symbolic UN success in its contribution containing the 1956 Suez Crisis. The invasion of Egypt in late 1956 by Israel, Britain and France to regain control of the Suez Canal caused a crisis. Pearson possibly averted a larger scale conflict by preventing both the

US and the Soviet Union from entering the conflict (Melady, 2006). The UN Emergency Force that intervened in this crisis during the Cold War was Pearson's creation, making it a defining moment in diplomatic leadership for Canada. "The peacekeeping model that emerged from the Suez permitted Canada to demonstrate worldwide military leadership in a niche role that was to become increasingly important" (Lerhe, 2012, p. 41). Peacekeeping evolved into a more tactical role, as world events were forever changing and the peacekeepers were becoming more involved in rebuilding nation-states. This has been referred to often as closer to 'peacemaking'. Canada played a peacemaking role as a member of the three Indo-China truce commissions (1954). India, in this case, was the neutral player, with Canada representing the west and Poland representing the communist bloc. Gilley observed that Canada's international influence depends on its western and in particular its US alliance (Gilley, 2011). During the same era when the Indonesian war was occurring (1945-63) Gilley cited Canada's role between the British and the US in smoothing over differences. Canada enjoyed the enviable role of being close enough to both the US and the UK to be trusted to represent both views equally.

Between 1947 and 1986, Canada participated in 19 peacekeeping missions. Most of these missions occurred under Liberal governments, however, peacekeeping became more prevalent and Canada participated in an astonishing 18 missions between 1987 and 1993 under Progressive Conservative governments. Under the leadership of Clark as Minister for External Affairs and Prime Minister Mulroney, Canada championed this style of active engagement abroad<sup>6</sup>.

In the 1990's, under Prime Minister Chrétien, Canada was involved in more combative peacekeeping missions where peace first had to be attained. During the Bosnian crises, the US was persistent on delivering multiple air strikes meanwhile Canadian peacekeepers were on the ground. Chrétien strongly objected and spoke publicly about his displeasure until the US backed down (Chrétien, 2010). The UK, France and Canada threatened to remove peacekeepers during this time and therefore convinced the US to keep an arms embargo in place with Bosnian Muslims. Under the UN, a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) strategy was developed under the leadership of Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Axworthy. Some of the challenges of the Balkans, Rwanda and Somalia peacekeeping missions displayed the necessity of peacekeepers having to engage and intervene. R2P had three components (Axworthy, 1997):

1. Responsibility of the international community to prevent outrages against human rights before they happen;
2. Responsibility to act in the first instance by political, economic and diplomatic means. But ultimately by military means if necessary;
3. Responsibility to rebuild after the crisis was over.

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<sup>6</sup> Joe Clark served as the Minister of External Affairs under Progressive Conservative PM Brian Mulroney

Many countries were opposed to this type of principle which could impede on their sovereignty. Paul Martin's administration worked behind the scenes to get a version of the R2P adopted through the UN after quiet diplomacy with countries such as "Jamaica, Pakistan, Algeria and Cuba" (Martin, 2009, p. 340).

The three central principles of UN peacekeeping described by Professor Dorn of the Canadian Forces College and Royal Military College of Canada in his March, 2007 testimony to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development are impartiality, consent, and minimum use of force (Dorn, 2007). Canada's role in the Afghanistan war was identified with the US effort to find and defeat the enemies, rather than being impartial in a conflict zone. Dorn said that Canada did not have the consent of the main parties to the conflict, or of the local population in Kandahar (Dorn, 2007). Consent for presence was always part of Canada's involvement, but in this instance Canada was not asking for any discussion on finding a peaceful solution. For Dorn, the Canadian forces in Afghanistan should have been following these guiding principles (Dorn, 2007):

1. Serve the local population first and foremost, not only to win hearts and minds but to make sure that their interests become our common cause;
2. Negotiate for peace and always give a way out to those committing violence, except for the most egregious crimes which should be referred to the ICC or special tribunal;
3. Do not paint all who oppose the international presence with the same brush.  
Recognize that not all who oppose the Canadian presence are Taliban Terrorists.

NATO achieved successes in Peace Support Operations in Kabul and other provinces. It was noted, however, that this was all jeopardized by some of the more aggressive measures undertaken in other provinces. Dorn suggested striking a balance between a 'hawk' approach and a 'dove' approach. His term is an 'owl' approach, which "has the wisdom to know when and where to engage" (Dorn, 2007). It attempts to strike the right balance between excessive use and under-use of force to make UN peacekeeping more effective.

There are less than 100 peacekeepers listed for Canada on the UN database (United Nations, 2015). Meanwhile, there are several hundred Canadian personnel stationed in Poland and in the sea next to Ukraine, not mandated as unbiased peacekeepers but as combat forces. Canada was one of the architects behind the UN, but has increasingly withdrawn participating with this institution. In 1991, Canada was the number one peacekeeper, meanwhile the statistics from June 2015 show Canada has slipped to 66<sup>th</sup> in the world (United Nations, 2015). This is not a trend that began under the Harper government, rather it started under the Chrétien government in 1993, implementing large cuts to Canadian participation in peacekeeping. The largest impetus for pulling away from UN peacekeeping was military spending for the war in Afghanistan (Barnes, 2013). Even with cuts made by Liberal governments in the 1970's and into the Progressive Conservative

Mulroney government in the 1980's, Canada remained in the top ten of UN peacekeeping participants. Current estimates for peacekeeping, including equipment and personnel, are limited to under \$10 million in the federal government budget, while the war in Afghanistan is now into the billions. As noted by Star columnist Carol Goar, "Canada has metamorphosed from a middle power that championed international co-operation and led the world in the campaign to eliminate deadly landmines into a country that seeks to be known for its military might" (Goar, 2015). Canada could be looking to lead the next important campaign for enhanced world human-security, but is instead targeting the limited defence resources it has towards combat.

# Chapter Three: Research Findings

## 3.1 Effects of Current Alliances

Since Canada's role on the UN Security Council expired in 2000, they were unable to regain the position from the international community. The reverence the world once had with Canada would not be as apparent when it had another opportunity in 2010. Chapter Two's findings established a notable shift in policy direction for Canada post-9/11. Canada lost a vote to both Germany in the first round of voting, and then to Portugal during the second round. After all of the history of Germany's quest for world dominance during both of the world wars, its' acceptance as a Security Council member above Canada is an indicator of how world public perception is derived more by recent actions on salient issues than by the nostalgic importance of historic alliances and past international achievements.

The Commonwealth has been an important vehicle for Canada to constructively engage governments, and insert itself as a trusted role in the mediation of issues. The Canadian government pulled away from this channel of diplomacy when Prime Minister Harper skipped the 2013 Commonwealth heads of government meeting in Colombo because of concerns about Sri Lanka's human-rights record. The following year, Canada continued its direction of disengagement by holding back \$10 million in annual voluntary funding for the Commonwealth Secretariat (Mackrael, 2014). While it is too early to tell the impact of this withdrawal on the legitimacy of the Commonwealth institution, it may have unintended consequences should Canada want to return to its past practices of utilizing this medium to advance diplomatic efforts.

The Harper government has focused its diplomatic efforts on building up economic alliances. Canada has based its relations with Chile in this way, as well as with a handful of other countries in the region, such as Columbia, Haiti, and Barbados. Engagement for economic cooperation is important for soft power, even if driven by an economic agenda. The Harper government uses soft power to formalize trade deals with various countries conforming to their agenda of free trade. They have also pursued trade agreements with China, South Korea and the European Union. Canada's long-standing constructive relationship with Cuba is also partly driven by economic benefits. Trade and political dialogue continued unchanged throughout each Canadian government after the Cuban revolution, while the US policy continued to hold a firm line against engaging Cuba. Canada's soft power credibility was on display when talks were held in Canada between Cuba and the Obama Administration to begin breaking down the long lasting trade embargo with Cuba (2015). "According to some U.S. officials, Canada's involvement in the most recent secret talks was nothing short of indispensable" (McKenna, 2014). Although Prime Minister Harper has not demonstrated sharp commitment to diplomacy, this is an example of enduring Canadian influence as being a catalyst for quiet diplomacy. The embassies in the US and Cuba are

now open, as of 2015, thanks to a more tolerant President and a willing trusted Canadian ally to facilitate dialogue.

Canada's foreign policy shift is evident in the Middle-East where Canadian hard power moves alongside unilateral policies of the US. Although Canada did not directly commit its military to the Iraq War in 2003, the Canadian military is there now, serving as trainers, providing surveillance aircraft, and in other capacities. As noted in the findings in Chapter Two, the decision not to participate in the Iraq War, along with a reluctance to be a full partner in BMD, were two substantive foreign policy decisions that were widely unpopular for the US abroad. Even with Canada declining to join its allies, close relations with the UK and the US remained during the course of the Iraq War. Canada could have remained allies with these countries without choosing to insert its military presence into Iraq, Syria, or Eastern Europe.

The current alliances Canada has with NATO member countries may be strong today, however the provocation of new adversaries is a relatively new position for Canada. The alliances with the US and the current Israeli government now take precedent over diplomatic relations with any country who does not share the same view, or who has not reached a mature democracy yet. The underlying reasons why these countries and regions are in chaotic turmoil, and have not progressed toward a free society with free governments are a complex issue beyond the scope of this study. Although not specifically the fault of the Canadian government, historic hegemonic dominance by 'Western civilization' over resources have played a significant role. Nothing can be more destabilizing to a country or a region than being in a constant state of armed conflict.

In an interview on CBC, various experts were asked what Canada's reputation looked like throughout the world. While they spoke positively of Canada's reputation in NATO member countries, all of them spoke of not being viewed positively in the African and Middle-East region. Janice Stein, from Munk School of Affairs, stated "In the Middle-East generally they're not very happy with us." Dr Samantha Hutt, from War Child Canada, followed by stating "...[Canada] is going through a significant amount of negativity throughout the Arab world and the continent of Africa as well." Aisha Ahmad from the University of Toronto concurred: "...definitely in the Middle-East our brand has dropped in stock quite significantly in recent days, and in other parts of the world we might be doing better" (Turning Point, 2013). The Middle-East and Africa is where an urgent need exists to find peaceful solutions, and therefore this revelation is sweepingly detrimental to Canadian soft power. By focusing too much on hard power in these regions, Canadian soft power is losing its relevance, effectiveness, and impact.

### **3.2 Reliance on Canadian/US military interoperability**

Military interoperability with the US and NATO include cooperation of industrial, logistical and doctrinal sharing. These partnerships are standardized and enshrined into Standardization

Agreements (Ukraine National Institute for Strategic Studies, n.d). For Middlemiss and Stairs, an official shift in advancing interoperability was formally adopted within Strategy 2020 (2006) without the consent of cabinet, or being formalized by the Martin government. They warn of the increasing military interoperability as higher levels of full integration might be the unintended consequence (Middlemiss, 2002). It is not only a political shift driving this evolution, as there has been significant advancement of Canadian reliance on interoperability by the Canadian bureaucracy (Middlemiss, 2002). If full integration ever becomes a reality, it will impact Canada's ability to not only exert soft power influence, but to be recognized at all in the international arena.

Canada has exemplified less soft power after 9/11 while Prime Minister Martin was at the helm, and even less pointedly with the initial election win in 2008 of Prime Minister Harper, followed by the majority election win in 2011. Although some examples were sourced of Canada's reluctance to become a full partner in US policy advancements post-9/11, Canada still indirectly participated in some missions that damaged the US image in the world. Middlemiss and Stairs were correct to conclude that it is more difficult for Canada to refuse the requests of contributing to US-led operations. It would be likewise more difficult to participate in their own operations without the help of the US.

Regardless of differences between political leaders the overall breadth of transnational cooperation with the US and Canada since WW2 naturally progressed. Canada began to differ in less disputes with the US since the 1960's (Keohane, 1977). Canada used the disagreements with the US politically and often celebrated its differences with the US as a domestic public opinion gain rather than utilizing the true nature of soft power - that is, quietly working to gain support of other countries through diplomacy (Lyon, 1963). Prime Minister Trudeau along with Head describe a shift away from Prime Minister Pearson's coined phrase "middle power" to one of an "effective power" from the late 1960's into the 1970's (Head & Trudeau, 1995).

Michael Byers cites that in Europe and elsewhere, Canadian foreign policy has been largely inseparable from the US. Canadians should be consulted, he believes, before their country's influence is effected on the world stage (Byers, 2002). When the Bush administration adopted a 'with us or against us' attitude, the end result was neither for Canada. Canada was not entirely outside however could not be defined as entirely separate. Canada did not participate in the war in Iraq, however as identified in Chapter Two, the Canadian Navy was mobilized in a defence capacity. More importantly, the Canadian forces took on a leading role in Afghanistan, which enabled the US to direct a stronger focus on Iraq. Byers assertion of being largely inseparable holds true, it is just a matter of how much Canadian influence is being affected.

Alignment with the US on some of the issues is not necessarily a negative strategy in itself. US troops who are stationed in places like East-Asia are welcomed by most states in order to act as an insurance policy against uncertain neighbours (Nye, 2002). It is, however, doubtful that the

plethora of US military bases stationed across the world are all perceived as positive, and could also be seen as a signal of an imperialist presence. Canada was able to avoid being assigned this type of label, as their forces were attached to multilateral missions, and primarily designed to be impartial. Historically, Canada has punched above its weight, not because of a powerful military, but because of the pursuit of international interests by participating in more than its fair share of multilateral missions (Byers, 2002).

Where Canada can have a more valuable contribution is improving relations in conflict zones by focusing on a direction of a robust military that is able to provide modernized peacekeeping or peacemaking units and one that has evolved itself to new theatres of conflict. These new style of conflicts are in the Middle-East, where opposing sides are not always known, and multiple non-state actors are involved. Byers suggests investing Canadian capacity to deploy and lead middle-power expeditionary forces, rather than duplicating US conventional naval, air and army capacities (Byers, 2002). Peacekeeping, and peacemaking involves negotiating with groups that are radical and are not interested in diplomacy leading hard power advocates to think this a naïve approach. But where there are opportunities to engage with legitimate heads of states, Canada should be looking to regain its historic role. Mckenna was asked what Canada's biggest strength was: "Our biggest strength should be our diplomatic efforts. We can make important contributions about ideas, strategies, initiatives and ways of resolving conflict peacefully" (Appendix A). Any possible progress should be welcomed in areas of conflict that are becoming less stable, and more of a haven for non-state military growth, after relentless hard power methods.

The Afghanistan War and interventions in Iraq and Syria, with Canada's participation, were focused on hard power and therefore it is questionable if this was the most appropriate role for Canada to take in the mission. Mckenna warns of this approach:

[Canada] can't just fall into line behind the U.S. and follow it into these complex and costly military missions like in Iraq and Syria today. We should seek the consent of legitimate international or regional political body first. And we should make sure what our involvement will entail, what our actual objectives will be, that it has the backing of the Canadian public, and that it has a clear exit strategy. (Appendix A)

As anti-Americanism sentiment intensified worldwide, particularly in the Middle-East, Canada was deeply involved in the hard power push in the Middle-East. Even though the Canadian governments embraced this mission, it is conceivable that the focus could have been directed more at tactical operations that focused on help for rebuilding Afghanistan and pursuing peace objectives. This is how peacekeeping principles helped resolve the intractable conflicts in Cambodia, East Timor, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the former Yugoslavia (Barnes, 2013). This is also how Canada diffused the 1956 Suez Crisis that was dividing the West, NATO, and religious



sides. As Barnes concludes, since 1950's Canada was reputable because of its focus on UN peacekeeping and collaborative leadership, but this is threatened by its current ties with the US and its involvement in Afghanistan (Barnes, 2013).

The initial US invasion of Iraq has vehemently destabilized an entire region already in turmoil. Hard power advocates would like to claim that influence with the US grows when making a contribution to their efforts, however there is a lack of evidence of the UK winning any concessions with the US for its direct participation in Iraq. And while Canada was a major partner in the hard power push in Afghanistan there is nothing to show of any greater leverage for Canada either. Canada's ability to engage in independent diplomacy, while interoperating in missions that align with Canadian goals of peace, and consensus building is the balanced way forward. McKenna is correct to point out that "Canada could be doing more with what we have in conflict areas if we had the political will to do so" (Appendix A). Contributing to NATO and NORAD is important for Canada's national security, but those investments should not override the political will to revitalize its past abilities to make the world safer through using Canadian specialized expertise in nation building. There are hundreds of treaties and agreements that have proven mutually beneficial to both Canada and the US. The US and Canada can embark on different paths, and continue to be close allies.

### **3.3 Impacts for Future Diplomatic Relations**

Close military interoperability with the US is necessary because of the evolution of reliance the Canadian military has undertaken over the last number of decades, however Canada can improve its stature and make better efforts to distinguish its foreign policy from the US if it wants to have a less bias, and more germane role in foreign affairs. In some areas Canada is actually perceived to be at least as bellicose if not more so in recent statements. "Harper has increased the rhetoric around Canada's role in the world and talked in more muscular terms" (Appendix A). In reaction to Russia's actions in the Ukraine, Canada was the first Western country to remove its ambassador to Russia, precipitating the end of dialogue with a permanent member of the UN Security Council. This is a discernible shift from the Canada that was one of only two Western country's that did not break formal relations with Cuba at the time of the 1959 Revolution.

The nation-building roots of Canada has taken a back seat to following a hardline forceful tone, and closer alignment with that of the historic hard power of the US. Chapnick highlights Canada's diplomatic potential and how it could be more effective in a world where soft power is increasingly important. Chapnick argues public diplomacy is indispensable:

Thanks to its history as a progressive, diplomatically agile, respected global player, Canada was well positioned on the new security environment. By organizing and working through coalitions of the willing – made up of state and/or non-state actors – to promote the

Canadian values of fairness, tolerance, and respect for the weak, Canada could become a global leader in post-Cold War conflict prevention. (Chapnick, 2011)

Recent Canadian foreign policy has been contrariwise exclusively focused on the conflict in Ukraine, and the fight against ISIS in the Middle-East. There is less conciliatory language from the top and less of a role for Canada to objectively find ways of quiet diplomatic pressure to countries who used to be on speaking terms with Canada. The middle-power classification Canada used to benefit from is in danger because of a contradiction in what Canada's bold statements are while actively participating in contravening those international principles in their collaboration with the US in the Middle-East operations. McKenna emphasizes the contradiction of condemning Russia for violating the territorial integrity of eastern Ukraine while violating the sovereign airspace of Syria. McKenna views both as clear violations of the principles and nostrums of proper international behaviour since neither Moscow nor Ottawa have secured the approval of the recognized sitting government to breach its territory or airspace (McKenna, 2015).

It is important for countries, like Canada, who are part of NATO, to assess all factors from both sides that led to the tension and find ways of objectively analysing its own actions. Canada has distanced itself from engaging in the required diplomacy needed to discover common ground with any country that is at odds with NATO policy, or US policy. This could be another reason Canada lost its election to a rotating seat on the UN Security Council. Observers noted that having Canada back on the Security Council would be like having two American votes (Barnes, 2013). Instead of avoiding the challenging roles of diplomacy with countries who have concerns of either NATO or US policy action, Canada could be acting as a catalyst by using its unique position with the US to enable diplomatic efforts.

What challenges the credibility of Canada's ability to engage in objective diplomacy is the avoidance of learning root causes for strained relations in the most complex of regions. In the Middle-East, for example, Canada will find it increasingly difficult to ever be able to provide a balanced broker role or contribute to an impartial policing force should attempts at peace talks ever resurface between Israel and Palestine. Canada has, in the past, provided aid packages and supported Palestinian parliamentary elections, however has since shifted to becoming very close to the position of the US and now completely one-sided in support of the current hard-line Israeli government. The European states are more apt to support Palestine's position of state recognition, with the US historically on the Israeli side. Canada historically sought to find a balance between the two sides. The UN vote during which Canada was one of only nine countries voting against the concept of the Palestinian state has alienated Canada's position, and marked their dissention with the vast majority of UN member states.

In order for Canada to return back to a more perceived balance in its policy in the Middle-East they would have to be prepared to challenge both sides of long-standing conflicts. This study

highlights a strong tendency to be on the side of its US ally in these matters, and in some cases since the election of the Harper government, less diplomatic in its actions than the Obama administration. Prior to taking such a rigid stance on the Israeli government's hard-line positions, Canada could have been one of the only countries able to station its military personnel on both sides of the conflict. Canada has recently shown no interest in desiring to be utilized in a conflict prevention strategy, as it was the first western country to withdraw funding from Palestine after the Hamas victory, and was one of the few not to reinstate it after President Abbas's reforms. Canada is aligning itself with the practices of the US and Israel and is not as concerned, at least outwardly, with whether or not these countries are always respecting international law. Canada is participating in the bombing of Syria with the US, using the right to use force as an act of self-defence. University of Ottawa law professor John Currie, told the Huffington Post that he and vast majority of international law experts are sceptical about that "radical extension of the right of traditional self-defence," which has been seriously pushed by only the US and Israel (Raj, 2015).

Poland Professors Marcin Gabrys and Prof Tomasz Soroka conclude there is not enough of a focus on soft power in Canadian foreign policy. They describe Canada's role in international affairs as a more bias, more determined, forceful tone. Prof Soroka was quoted as saying "What I think that Canada ... misses in its foreign policy is this soft power, promotion of its soft power. And Canada has so much to promote" (Ayed, 2015). They advocate and define a 'selective power'. The many descriptions of power coined for Canada, analogous to 'effective power' from Head and Trudeau, are used to describe Canada's comparative advantages in a global context. Pragmatically, Canada's best course of action is not by following a strict strong conventional military power, nor is it by leading a pacifist foreign policy.

Shortly after the interview held with the Polish professor's, an index of the "soft power 30" countries was released. It was compiled by Portland, a London-based PR firm, together with Facebook, providing data on governments' online impact, and ComRes, which ran opinion polls on international attitudes (July, 2015). The comprehensive study ranked Canada as 5<sup>th</sup> in the world. The findings are as follows:

Canada has long been a soft-power heavyweight, preferring to speak softly (and wisely) rather than carry a big stick. Its place near the summit of the rankings is fully deserved: our polling shows people feel more favourably towards Canada than any other country . . . it is Canada's behaviour on the world stage that has earned the respect of public opinion. . . However, Canada cannot afford to rest on the groundswell of goodwill it has built up in past decades. Reputations can be squandered as quickly as they are gained. Recent moves to slash foreign aid spending, close embassies abroad and abolish the highly respected Canadian International Development Agency put Canada's status as a soft-power superpower at risk. (Portland Communications, 2015)

The study ranked the US ahead of Canada in soft power as 3<sup>rd</sup> overall because of its undeniable influence over the world as a superpower and being home to the majority of well-known brands. However, they point out “the US is also brought down on polling - particularly on international trust of America's foreign policy intentions” (Portland Communications, 2015). They give large credence to all of the other categories of the study. The weight of each category is debatable. In terms of selecting a country most likely to utilize its soft power, this category should bear more weight.

Canada does not have the military capacity to be a leading conventional army in the world if it wanted to, as it continues to lag significantly behind the NATO target of 2% GDP spending on defence, with no conceivable way of convincing its electorate that doubling the budget should be a priority. As McKenna states “... we have to act wisely, pragmatically and strategically when it comes to our international posture. We can't do things that great powers can do” (Appendix A). Canada has not had a significant leading military force since the decade following WW2. It could be a “selective power”, an “effective power”, a “middle power”, an “honest broker”, or a “smart power”. Any of these options require promoting the tremendous Canadian soft power potential that exists while recognizing the importance of hard power.

## **Conclusion**

The study concludes that Canada's military interoperability with the US has little direct impact on Canadian diplomatic potential. However, reliance on the US to perform robust military operations is consequential in exploiting the best utilization of Canadian soft power. This study's findings demonstrate that Canada should re-evaluate when to engage and where defence funds should be appropriated for engagement in missions involving the world's most complex, unstable regions.

By using Nye's definition of soft power to derive these findings, this analysis has revealed multiple instances of Canadian soft power influence in developing international institutions, pioneering peacekeeping missions, and abstaining from engaging in unilateral conflicts. Because of a post 9/11 shift involving more combative undertones, and uncompromising alignment with one-side of conflicts over the other, Canada risks having less of a trusted independent voice in utilizing soft power for potential diplomatic efforts. Simultaneously, with increasing operational alignment with the US, the role for Canada in international affairs becomes increasingly uncertain and of less value in the most unstable regions. To pursue a more independent foreign policy, a natural observation suggests more spending in defence could be of benefit. The direction of where funding is applied is what will determine Canada's combined power. Increased military spending of hard power capacity does not preclude a strengthening of soft power in all of the currencies identified by

Nye. In other words, efforts can be made to regain Canadian soft power, while maintaining or building up its defence capacity.

The evidence presented in this study reinforces the work from Middlemiss and Stairs. Because of significant defence reductions since WW2, Canada is now in a position where much of its military capabilities are directly linked with interoperability with the US. The direction of military spending outside of interoperability should include providing a sufficient amount of funding for a properly equipped military in the arctic because once arctic ice melts, it will pose a serious security issue and become an even greater sovereign contention with the US. Since Canada's "only game in town" is interoperation with the US, it creates a challenge to be perceived in the world as having an independent foreign policy with a strong focus on soft power. The data suggests that military interoperability does not in itself prevent quiet diplomacy. The critical variable in assessing diplomatic strength is the effect of public opinion on foreign policy decisions in each instance.

This study concludes that Canada cannot be a world super power. Not on its own. It can continue to participate as a partner in the front-lines of combat with the US world super power, and receive broad recognition from NATO members of that alignment. However, that choice limits its soft power when overall world public opinion is unfavourable, or particularly when it is unfavourable in the region in need of more diplomatic attention. The alternative option is seeking to promote world peace through calculated quiet diplomacy; modernizing the peacekeeping strategy; reinvesting in targeted humanitarian aid; governance and nation building; championing the legitimacy of the UN and other multilateral organizations; and reinserting its human security values in Africa and the Middle-East by ensuring educational programs and health agencies are available. This option comes with a cost to the defence budget, but this cost would be more palatable to the Canadian electorate since it wouldn't be directed solely at conventional style warfare.

Maintaining a close relationship with the US to benefit from continuing with interoperability arrangements and sharing of the unmatched intelligence the US provides is less of a choice than it was after WW2, and more of a reality. What should be better defined is what is Canada's role going forward in this arrangement and how can it best deliver on the international arena to actively promote peace while protecting its own identity and sovereignty. Soft power, in today's fractious world is more important now than ever before. Canada has made less of an effort post 9/11 to distinguish itself from US foreign policy, and therefore Canadian soft power is dangerously approaching the precipice of decline. The US-Canadian alliance is arguably the closest partnership economically and militarily in the world. There is no reason why this cannot continue while Canada embarks on an international policy that is intrinsically its own.

## **Possible Areas for Future Research**

1. Defence budget analysis for Canada measuring conventional weaponry, peacekeeping and nation building exercises. An in depth look at examining if the Canadian electorate are inclined or disinclined to pay for a defence capability that allows for more international engagement.
2. Examining the 2001-2010 period narrowly to assess the US/Canadian relationship after the arrival of the Obama administration and the Harper government.
3. What impact Canada's lack of action on climate change has on its soft power strength. (International civil society has ranked Canada as the number 1 worst offender in obstructing international climate change agreements).
4. How the vulnerability of defending the arctic plays a role in future Canadian military strategy. Looking closely at the historic dispute with the US, Russia and Europe on arctic sovereignty.

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## Appendix A

Interview with Dr Peter McKenna, Professor and Chair of Political Science at the University of Prince Edward Island (UPEI)

1. Has the level of defence spending (contrasted with that of the US) impacted the ability for Canada to conduct its own independent military and foreign affairs agenda? And do you believe Canada should be spending at least 2% of its GDP on defence, as set out by NATO?

Independent is the operative word here. I don't believe that Canada's defence budget—at roughly \$20 billion—impeded our ability to act autonomously. But we have to act wisely, pragmatically and strategically when it comes to our international posture. We can't do things that great powers can do. We are a small-to-middling power in the role—and that restricts what roles and responsibilities we can take on in the world. Acting in concert with other states—through coalitions, multilateral arrangements and with our western allies—is still a key means of realizing Canadian foreign policy objectives. Defence spending does matter. But Canadians will only tolerate so much on defence as opposed to other areas like health care, education and social programs. To get to where we could act like a major power would require huge expenditures beyond what we have now have on defence—and would be totally unacceptable to Canadians.

No need to spend exactly what the NATO figure is. Canadians have often complained about how the figure doesn't really capture the true nature of Canada's total defence outlays. Still, a defence budget of \$20 billion (though now shrinking because of the Harper government's drive to balance the books for 2015) is nothing to sneeze at. It's not so much the figure that matters as it is what we do with the \$20 billion. It's very expensive to be buying new fighter jets and replacing rusted naval frigates and supply ships. I do believe that the purchase of the 5 heavy airlift planes (the C5s) was a worthwhile expenditure. It has allowed us to transport huge amounts of aid and equipment to faraway places like the Middle East and Haiti. But I don't think that we need to meet NATO's 2 per cent figure. We need to realize that we're not going to be major players on the world stage like we were just after WW II. We can't compete with the other major powers in defence spending—nor do we have to or want to. That said, Canada could be doing more with what we have in conflict areas if we had the political will to do so.

2. Has the international role of Canada shifted from post-WW2 from a type of “middle-power”, or “honest broker”, to a more aggressive military power?

I think that Harper has increased the rhetoric around Canada's role in the world and talked in more muscular terms. But we haven't been more aggressive in the world. Most countries around the world know that Canada is mostly blowing smoke and don't have the horses to match their tough talk. Canada is still a small-to-middling power in the world. That limits us to certain roles and functions, which Harper has definitely sought to move us away from. And here I'm talking mostly about bridge-building, mediation, conflict-resolution and peacekeeping. His government has downplayed multilateralism and utilizing the UN. But our commitment to military engagements like Libya in 2011 and Iraq/Syria in 2015 have required only small military commitments—mostly five or six CF-18s. The commitment hardly meets the harsh/scary rhetoric that we often hear from the Harperites. If ISIS is really that dangerous and threatening, wouldn't you think we could scrape together

more than 6 fighter jets? The move into Syria is unsettling—and in my view—in clear violation of international law. The tough talk against Russia is just talk—and largely for domestic political purposes (courting the Ukrainian-Canadian vote). With our current defence posture, we can't back up our tough talk with a credible means of threatening the Russians, for instance. And these countries all know that. So the tough talk—like much of Canada defence and foreign policies—is really about electoral politics. It certainly plays well to the Conservative base, and that is of critical importance to Harper's re-election strategy. Yes, the language has been tougher, but our actions haven't much changed. And our tough talk—like in the case of Iran—has only managed to isolate Canada internationally and even piss off our American friends.

3. In your view, can Canada re-invent its UN-based peacekeeping stature to adjust to today's military theatre? Will they ever be back in the top 10 in the world? (now 66<sup>th</sup>)

It's hard to say. I would think not in the short term. Yes, there are important peacekeeping missions in the world today. But they are not always of the first-generation variety—and the ones that Canada most excelled in—and have become increasingly more dangerous, drawn out and costly. We could still be doing more. And, I suspect, if the Liberals or NDP are elected on October 19<sup>th</sup>, I think that we will be. But it will be most likely be small steps first. We could certainly use the heavy airlift C5s to good use to assist missions in other parts of the world. Putting troops in harm's way is another matter. Remember, we're still dealing with the fallout from the Afghan war—and I doubt that Canadians have the appetite for getting bogged down in a deadly and costly peace support operation in, say, Africa. To get back in the top ten would likely be a long term goal over ten years or so. But if the political will and money is there, Canada could at least get back in the game of peacekeeping as a legitimate player. Having said, we should not always be quick to say "yes" every time that the UN asks. We will need to judge each mission proposal on its merits, its cost in dollar terms and to the Canadian military, and whether it serves Canadian foreign policy interests. One thing is for sure, we'll be saying yes more that the Conservatives ever did if the Harper government is defeated in October. But it will be small steps first and a cautious yes as opposed to a definite no—as was the case under the Harper government.

4. Is Canada working within international law when they engage in an international conflict without the consent of the UN Security Council?

I believe so. But then, again, the 1999 intervention in Kosovo did not have the support of the UN. It was, however, a NATO military operation—and one that I supported. The UN did sort of give it a "wink, wink—nudge, nudge," but the Russians and Chinese were opposed. Anyway, I still believe that Canada should not be, as a general rule, engaging in international military adventure without the endorsement of the UN and a strict UN mandate. Chretien was right in 2003 to stay away from Iraq without the backing of the world body. As I said above, I think that Canada is violating international humanitarian law by bombing Syria without the consent of the Syrian government or a UN mandate (Chapter 7 mission). Of course, Libya shocked the Russians and the Chinese, who now fear any Responsibility to Protect missions that involve military intervention for moral or humanitarian reasons. As Libya showed, the U.S. and the West turned the 2011 Libyan operation into one of regime change and removing Muammar Gadhafi. They don't want the same thing to happen to them. That is why future missions like this might be difficult

to get full UN Security Council support. Canada will then have to see whether it could have the support of regional bodies like the OAS, the African Union, the Arab League or perhaps even NATO. But we can't just fall into line behind the U.S. and follow it into these complex and costly military missions like in Iraq and Syria today. We should seek the consent of legitimate international or regional political body first. And we should make sure what our involvement will entail, what our actual objectives will be, that it has the backing of the Canadian public, and that it has a clear exit strategy.

5. What is Canada's biggest strength when engaging in international affairs?

Our biggest strength should be our diplomatic efforts. We can make important contributions about ideas, strategies, initiatives and ways of resolving conflict peacefully. No country benefits more from stability and order in the international system than a trade-dependent country like Canada. So we should seek to play a role that defuses conflicts, seeks to avoid wars, strives to foster a compromise and accommodation, and always opts for mediation and bridge-building over aggression and destruction. This requires top-notch foreign service officers and diplomats who know how to negotiate, build confidence and trust, and find ways of reaching a diplomatic compromise. It also requires working well with others (i.e. strength in numbers) and working within the confines of international/multilateral fora. We can't make things happen internationally on our own. We just don't have the power resources to do so. That requires us to utilize our intellectual capabilities, our good offices, our past reputation for moderation and fair-mindedness, and our willingness to back up our words with action and money. We sometimes forget that other countries around the world really do want to hear what Canada has to say. This type of soft power, if you will, still has some currency on the world stage. The problem with the current Harper government is that it has undermined the foreign service, under-used its many talents, imposed a gag order, and ignored its advice (when it has gone against the Centre). We need to get back to a time when our diplomats were regarded as some of the best in the world; where our ideas and intellectual offerings made a huge difference in world politics; where we worked extremely well with building coalitions of like-minded countries, and where Canadian interests were well served by collective efforts at system-maintenance types of roles. We need to get back to utilizing that important strength and having our presence on the world stage once again respected and welcomed.