Topology of a Gordian Knot: Honor and Endorsement in the Construction of Intractable Conflict in Palestine

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In intractable conflicts, where issues appear indivisible, what factors lead populations to accept negotiated outcomes? We argue that when there is a perception of past humiliation committed by a negotiating adversary, populations will respond to cues that suggest that the scales of justice have been balanced. To examine these issues, we conduct a survey experiment on a representative sample of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza. We find that holding the negotiated settlement outcome constant, approval of the settlement is strongly influenced by whether it is framed as a negotiating defeat for the Israeli or the Palestinian side as well as by the endorsement of religious figures. As predicted by the theory, these effects are strongly mediated by perceptions of the fairness of the settlement outcome. Thus, the acceptance of a political settlement will depend not only on its concrete details, but in large part on the political cues that frame judgments of fairness.

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Some entrenched conflicts come to seem unresolvable, and the issues involved can come to appear indivisible. The question of what sorts of efforts could prove effective at ending them remains open. In the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, for instance, Sheik Yassin Al-'Ajlouni recently called for a Jewish right to pray on what he called the Beit Al-Maqdis or what Israel calls the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. He further asked the chief religious authorities in Palestine and Jordan to issue a fatwa clarifying their religious position on this fundamental question.¹ Could such elite contestation of traditional religious and grievance narratives influence what settlements are considered acceptable or even make political compromise possible?²

In enduring conflicts, particularly when considerations of fairness and honor are involved, participants tend to be highly emotionally engaged. Understanding the determinants of the affective response to compromise, therefore, is likely key to understanding the development of political preferences over settlement outcomes. We find that these determinants go well beyond the facts of the agreement itself.

Following a substantial literature in psychology, we hypothesize that judgments of fairness are principal mediators of affective response. We argue that when there is a perception of an unfair or illegitimate past act committed by a negotiating adversary, populations will respond to *cues* that suggest that the scales of justice have been balanced. Further, in forming such judgments, as in other political contexts, populations do indeed take cues from prominent individuals and institutions.

To examine these issues, we conducted a survey experiment on a representative sample of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza. Holding the negotiated settlement outcome constant, approval of the settlement is strongly influenced by whether it is framed as a negotiating defeat for the Israeli or the Palestinian side as well as by the endorsement of religious figures. When the settlement was not described as having been endorsed by a religious figure and was framed as a defeat for the Palestinian side, a large

¹Israel Today, December 23, 2014, "Muslim Cleric Says Jews Should Pray on Temple Mount."

²For differing accounts of the sources of "issue indivisibility" see, for example, Hassner (2003) and Goddard (2006).

majority of respondents were against the proposed settlement. When the settlement was endorsed and framed as a Palestinian victory, a bare majority were in favor and less than a quarter of respondents were opposed. As predicted by the theory, these effects are strongly mediated by perceptions of the fairness of the settlement outcome. Thus, the acceptance of a political settlement depends not only on its concrete details, but in large part on the political cues that frame judgments of fairness. The diplomatic framing and response of societal actors appears to play a principal role in the settlement of disputes.

When Is a Concession Palatable?

Even in the most intractable conflicts, compromise positions generally exist. When sides have multiple competing demands, for instance, there must be a settlement outcome that would leave both sides wishing some aspect of the settlement were otherwise.³ We investigate when such comprise positions will be found palatable. We hypothesize that this will be largely determined by whether an agreement is perceived as fair, both in terms of the specifics of the distribution of benefits and the procedure through which an agreement appears to have been reached.⁴

Intuition, knowledge of particular conflicts and voluminous psychological research indicate that fairness concerns drive much of human interaction. Preferences for equal outcomes, for instance, all else held constant, have been shown to exist across cultural contexts (Thaler 1988; Gth and Schwartz 1982; Gth 1995; Oosterbeek and Kuilen 2004; Kahneman and Thaler 1986). The literature in psychology describes "fairness heuristics" that are used to regulate many aspects of social interaction. Rather than calculate an optimal action in particular social contexts, which may not even be possible given the multiple equilibria and fluid, repeating dynamics that exist in many social situations, decision-makers use much simpler

³These issues are discussed in Fearon (1995).

⁴Other factors are discussed in Trager (2013) and Trager and Vavreck (2011).

considerations of fairness to guide action (Lind 2001). The prevalence of these heuristics across cultures suggests that they are not merely cultural constructs, but have fundamental biological bases as well. Some of these same fairness concerns have even been found to drive behavior in other mammalian species, such as capuchin monkeys and dogs (Brosnan and de Waal (2003)).

While psychologists have investigated how individuals interpret fairness and respond in a wide range of contexts, however, few studies investigate how fairness is constructed in political interactions. International relations scholars, for instance, have paid relatively little attention to fairness considerations as determinants of actor preferences and drivers of action at the international level. The few exceptions largely focus on international economic relations (Kapstein 2006, 2008) and international law (Franck 1995). Some recent scholarship, however, has begun to evaluate how norms of justice impact international negotiations and the content of agreements in the realm of politics (Albin 2001; Zartman and Kremenyuk 2005). Evidence also indicates that equitable agreements help to sustain a durable peace following civil wars (Druckman and Albin 2011), and that procedural justice can help achieve such agreements (Albin and Druckman 2012).

We focus on how fairness judgments inform preferences because of the ubiquitous and important roles that psychological studies have shown fairness concerns to play in determining actor choices. Fairness concerns frequently cause actors to behave contrary to their immediate self-interest (Andreoni and Miller 1996). In ultimatum games, for instance, low offers are rejected because they are deemed unfair (Camerer and Thaler 1995). Consumers refuse to pay monopoly prices because they are deemed unfair (Thaler 1985; Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986a, 1986b). In the workplace, practices by authority figures that are deemed unfair lead to dramatically reduced effort by subordinates. By contrast, individuals who believe they have been treated fairly will behave in a less individualist or selfish fashion.⁵

⁵A survey of psychological literature on fairness can be found in Lind (2001).

As one might expect, fairness judgments are made in part by evaluating distributional outcomes.⁶ More favorable outcomes are also often evaluated more favorably whether or not they are thought be fair, and self-interest also influences judgments about what is considered fair.⁷ In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we expect more favorable outcomes to be associated with higher levels of popular approval, leading to the *Objective Outcome Hypothesis*. The observed effect of the objective outcome was intended as a baseline against which to measure the influences of other factors.

Objective Outcome Hypothesis: A favorable change in the objective outcome increases the approval of the agreement, and approval is mediated by perceptions of fairness.

What is considered fair is a complex social judgment, however, that goes beyond an evaluation of the distributional outcome. As in other areas of social calculation, when direct information is unavailable or difficult to obtain, or judgments are difficult to form, individuals will rely on "cues." Thus, political and religious elites "provide structure to the foreign policy opinions of the public" (Berinsky 2009, 124) and generate dissent from established positions "even in the absence of vocal opposition, provided a strong cue-giver takes a clear position on that policy." (Berinsky 2009, 70; see also Zaller 1992) We therefore expect observers to take cues from the most relevant elites in forming their own judgments about whether an agreement should be accepted and whether it is fair. In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and particularly as it pertains to the holy sites, we expect the most relevant elites to be religious leaders, which leads to our next hypothesis.

Religious Endorsement Hypothesis: Endorsement of religious authorities increases the approval of the agreement, and approval is mediated by perceptions of fairness.

This hypothesis contrast with the well-known argument in Hassner (2009) that the indivisibility of

⁶See works cited above, as well as, for instance, Lind and Lissak (1985), van den Bos (1999) and Camerer and Thaler (1995).

⁷See Buchan, Croson, and Johnson (2004), Messick and Sentis (1979), Dawes and Thaler (1988), and Rabin (1998, 16).

Jerusalem's Temple Mount is an inherent quality of that space, the fruit of "fundamental social facts" – such as competing religious attachments – that leaders "cannot easily define and redefine" (Hassner 2009, 10-11). Accordingly, Hassner argues that tensions over Jerusalem will "erupt as soon as one party perceives changes in the balance of power" over its holy spaces (Hassner 2009, 24), leaving little hope that a negotiated settlement over the Temple Mount in Jerusalem can ever be reached.⁸

Our hypothesis is consistent with the argument in Goddard (2009, 18, 39), which views indivisibility as constructed through legitimating political rhetoric. Goddard thus asks whether Jerusalem's indivisibility can be undone by the rhetoric of certain well-placed actors (Ibid., 207). For such rhetoric endorsing compromise to be perceived as legitimate, Goddard theorizes that it must emanate from leaders centrally located in salient "social and cultural networks." (Ibid., 19) Further, the legitimating statements must be "consistent with an existing myth-symbol complex [and] incorporate symbols and language institutionalized within the society" (Ibid., 24). Thus, to render disputed holy ground divisible, rhetoric must align with existing religious and ideological beliefs, and must come from elites with moral authority. Goddard argues that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, due to his lack of ties to Islamist groups, cannot legitimize any division of Jerusalem's holy spaces by himself (Ibid., 26). We ask whether religious authorities might play this role.

We also expect observers to be sensitive to cues about the justice of the procedure through which an agreement was reached. Such sensitivities have been demonstrated in a range of areas.⁹ For instance, in ultimatum games, players are likely to perceive low offers as fair, and accept them, if they believe the offers were generated by a computer rather than another player, or by a disinterested third party (Camerer

⁸Svensson (2007) also argues that territorial disputes anchored in religious claims lead to perceptions of indivisibility and are much less likely to be resolved via negotiation.

⁹See Folger and Konovsky (1989), Lind, Kulik, Ambrose, and De Vera Park (1993), Tyler and Caine (1981) Tyler and Folger (1980), Tyler, Rasinski and McGraw (1985), Lerner and Whitehead (1980), Rutte and Messick (1995).

and Thaler 1995). Other literature shows that any event perceived as unfair will heighten sensitivity to subsequent events and outcomes that may be viewed as unfair (Wijn and van den Bos 2010). In a political context, Abin (2012) argue that procedurally just negotiations result in agreements with which the parties are more likely to comply.

In the procedural justice literature in psychology, the single most replicated finding is that having a "voice" in determining (or even commenting on) an outcome will increase the perceived fairness of the outcome.¹⁰ When voice is denied, such that outcomes are perceived as imposed, outcomes are found to be unfair. Thus, populations that view their voice as having been denied in the past will respond to cues that suggest their side's influence over events has been reestablished. Such effects are likely to be all the stronger when past history is viewed as humiliating and is highly salient as a result.¹¹ We therefore hypothesize that the Palestinian population will view agreements that appear imposed on Israel by the Palestinian side more favorably than agreements that are viewed as having been imposed by Israel, *controlling for the substantive content of agreements*.

Procedural Justice Hypothesis: In contexts where "voice" is perceived to have been denied in the past, the appearance of forcing a concession on an adversary increases the approval of the agreement. This effect on approval is mediated by perceptions of fairness.

Experimental Design

To investigate these questions, we conducted a survey experiment in Arabic on a representative sample of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Participants were first told "The following questions relate to recent negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Leadership. You will be presented with one of the

¹⁰Lind, Kanfer, and Earley (1990). According to Tyler (1989), this finding relates particularly to dispute as opposed to collective action environments.

¹¹On past humiliation as an obstacle to peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict, see Moisi (2007) and Fattah and Fierke (2009).

negotiating points discussed by the parties and asked whether you approve or disapprove of a hypothetical settlement of that issue. The organization conducting this survey is not associated with either of the parties." We then described the division of Jerusalem in a hypothetical peace agreement between the sides and asked whether respondents approved of the settlement and whether they thought it was fair.

The survey was conducted in cooperation with the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion. Due to the controversial nature of the topic, a large number of households either declined to be interviewed at all or refused to listen to the survey vignette. This left us with a sample of 384 households that answered the survey and passed checks demonstrating that they had listened to the survey vignette. As we discuss further below, this population does not differ substantially on demographic measures from the total Palestinian population or from the total population that we attempted to interview. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out that the population that was willing to be surveyed differs in important, unobserved, ways from the population that was not willing to be surveyed.

In each vignette, participants were told that Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem would go to Israel and Palestinian neighborhoods to Palestine. Further, "the Old City will be divided in half, with the Christian and Muslim quarters going to Palestine, and the Jewish and Armenian Quarters going to Israel. Israel will retain control of the Western Wall." In all vignettes we also specified that "there will be a new right of prayer on the Haram for Jews." Thus, the outcome described was such that significant constituencies on both sides would view aspects of the agreement as a concession. The proposed agreement is based on the offers proposed at Camp David in 2000 and in the "Clinton Parameters" and is likely to resemble any future peace proposal. We embedded three treatments in the vignettes: the nature of sovereignty over the Haram al Sharif (Outcome Treatment); in the case of divided sovereignty, the side that was described as forcing this concession on the other (Concession Treatment); and whether the agreement was supported by Palestinian religious figures (Religious Endorsement Treatment). The Concession Treatment consisted of telling participants either that "the Palestinian leadership conceded that there will be divided sovereignty over the Haram al Sharif between Israel and the Palestinians" or that "the Palestinian Leadership was able to force Israel to compromise such that there will be divided sovereignty over the Haram al Sharif between Israel and the Palestinians." The Religious Endorsement Treatment consisted of including the statement that "Former Mufti Sheikh Ekrima Sa'id Sabri and present Mufti Muhammad Ahmad Hussein are both ready to accept this solution, if it brings long term stability" or not including that statement. A sample survey is presented in English Appendix A and in Arabic in Appendix B.

We employed a six cell treatment design illustrated in Figure 1. The Concession and Religious Endorsement treatments were fully crossed (4 cells). We also included a control (5th cell) that did not receive either of those two treatments and a sixth cell that received neither of those two treatments, but received the Outcome Treatment. Thus, the control group comprised of 30% of the respondents were read the proposed deal, including the division of Jerusalem, shared sovereignty over the Temple Mount and a new right of Jewish Prayer on the Mount, without any additional treatment or framing. Four groups comprised of 15% of the respondents each were told, respectively, that the proposed deal was (1) a Palestinian concession; (2) a Palestinian concession endorsed by Palestinian religious elites; (3) an Israeli concession; or (4) an Israeli concession endorsed by Palestinian religious elites. Thus, comparing groups (1) and (2) to the control group and to groups (3) and (4) is a test of the Procedural Justice Hypothesis. Comparing groups (2) and (4) to the control group and to groups (1) and (3) is a test of the *Religious Endorsement* Hypothesis. Finally, 10% of respondents were presented with an outcome that envisaged full Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram al Sharif, with Jewish prayer rights introduced, that is, an outcome objectively more favorable to the Palestinian side than the outcome described in the other treatments. We shall refer to this as the Better Outcome condition. Comparing responses given by this group to those of the control group allows for a test of the *Objective Outcome Hypothesis*.

Outcome 1 – Control Group (30% of respondents)

- Shared sovereignty on Temple Mount; Jewish right of prayer
- No concession framing, no religious endorsement




FIGURE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF TREATMENTS AMONG RESPONDENTS.

The survey was administered by 50 trained interviewers (40 women and 10 men monitored by an additional16 supervisors) to a representative sample of 1054 Palestinian adults in 16 governorates (provinces) of the West Bank and Gaza Strip from October 15 to 28, 2014. Within these governorates, 170 primary sampling units were chosen at random from 998 Palestinian election polling centers (127 in the West Bank and 43 in Gaza) such that 654 individuals were interviewed in the West Bank and 400 in Gaza. Households were randomly sampled at the sub-district level. In each selected household, the adult with the birthdate closest to the end of the year was interviewed. The vignettes were randomly assigned to households within the 170 sub-districts.

We were able to collect demographic information on all of the households we attempted to interview,

including those that either refused to answer questions or gave answers that demonstrated an unwillingness to attend to the details of the survey vignette (i.e. failed manipulation checks). Interviewers reported that some participants became angry at being asked to answer questions about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and some gave answers to questions while making it obviously clear that they would not listen to the vignette. We have therefore elected to analyze the set of respondents that answered all of the questions and passed standard manipulation checks. We recognize that this could lead to sampling bias since the population that refused to answer the questions or listen to the vignettes might differ significantly from the population we study. We were able collect data on the entire population we attempted to interview, however, and not that the populations do not differ substantially on observed demographic characteristics. This data is presented in Appendix C.

Results

The difference between divided and full sovereignty over the Haram al Sharif did not influence survey respondents. Approval levels for the Control condition (divided sovereignty) and the Better Outcome condition (full sovereignty) can be seen in the leftmost columns of Figure 2. There is no statistically significant difference between the fraction of respondents approving of the two treatments. The non-result may have been driven by the amount of information about the settlement conveyed to respondents of which the manipulation comprised a relatively small part. Nevertheless, we were surprised by this result and note that it is in contrast to the effects of the other treatments.

The *Procedural Justice Hypothesis* is strongly supported. This can be seen by comparing the two rightmost columns of Figure 2. When Palestinian negotiators are framed as having forced Israel to concede that there will be divided sovereignty over the Haram al Sharif, 48% of respondents supported the settlement. Holding the actual described outcome of the settlement constant, when Israel is framed as having forced Palestinian negotiators to concede that there will be divided sovereignty over the Haram, only 24% of respondents approved of the settlement. This difference is significant at the 0.01 error level.




FIGURE 2. EFFECT OF FORCING A CONCESSION.

The *Religious Endorsement Hypothesis* is also strongly supported. Approval of the agreement rises from 24% when no religious authorities are described as supporting the agreement to 36% if former Mufti Sheikh Ekrima Sa'id Sabri and present Mufti Muhammad Ahmad Hussein are in support. This difference is significant at the 0.05 error level. Figure 3 illustrates these difference and shows that the percent of respondents that find the agreement to be at least "somewhat fair" follows a similar pattern. This same pattern of close relationship between perceived fairness and level of approval holds for all treatments. We shall return to the mediating effect of perceptions of fairness below.¹²

¹²To our surprise, across subgroups, the percent of respondent who found the agreement fair was consistently higher than




FIGURE 3. EFFECT OF ENDORSEMENT BY RELIGIOUS FIGURES.

We employed an ordered probit to investigate effects of the treatments at the individual level and to allow for demographic controls. The dependent variable is the 5-category scale of approval from "strongly approve" to "strongly disapprove." The key independent variables corresponding to the three treatments are "Israeli Concession Framing," "Religious Endorsement," and "Outcome". The first is coded 2 when the agreement is described as including a concession by Israel over the Haram, 1 when neither side is described as having been forced to make this concession, and 0 when the Palestinian side is framed as

the percept who approved of the agreement. We are unsure of the drivers of this pattern.

having been forced into concession. The other two variables are binary, and correspond to the other two treatments described. The results are presented in Table 2. The base model with only the treatment variables shows that the effect of "Israeli Concession Framing" and "Religious Endorsement" are in the expected directions and highly significant. The addition of demographic controls in Model 2 bolsters these results slightly. Two of the demographic controls are significant. Younger respondents are more likely to approve a settlement. Christian respondents, which represent less then 2% of the sample, are also more likely to approve a settlement.

	Model 1: Base	Model 2: Demographic Controls
Israeli Concession Framing	0.26**	0.27**
	(0.09)	(0.09)
Religious Endorsement	0.42**	0.47***
-	(0.14)	(0.14)
Outcome	-0.21	-0.19
	(0.15)	(0.15)
Gender		0.01
		(0.11)
Age		-0.11*
		(0.04)
Education Level		0.01
		(0.05)
Muslim / Christian		1.12^{*}
		(0.49)
Degree of Religiosity		-0.12
		(0.09)
Ν	384	384

 $p \le 0.05; p \le 0.01; p \le 0.001; p \le 0.001.$

TABLE 2. SETTLEMENT APPROVAL: ORDERED PROBIT ESTIMATES

To show how substantively significant these findings are, the implications of the analysis are illustrated in Figure 4. In the absence of either the appearance of a concession being forced upon Israel or the endorsement of religious figures, the model predicts that 56% of Palestinians would be opposed to the agreement as opposed to only 17% in support. When the agreement is framed as having been forced upon Israel and religious figures endorse it, by contrast, a bare majority of Palestinians is predicted to be in support with only 21% either strongly or weakly opposed.




FIGURE 4. EFFECT ON POPULATION SUPPORT FOR SETTLEMENT.

To account for these results, we now analyze the mediating effect of fairness considerations. At the aggregate level, approval and fairness track closely in all treatment conditions. To investigate the mediating influence of fairness judgments on approval, we again employ regression analysis at the individual level. To understand the extent to which the effect of the manipulations on approval was driven by perceptions of the fairness of the outcome, we performed causal mediation analysis (Imai, Keele and Yamamoto 2010, Imai et al. 2011). We employ a two equation approach, regressing the 7-point scale of the Fairness variable on each of the treatments (separately) and regressing the 5-point scale of the Approval variable on the

treatment and Fairness mediator.¹³ We estimate that 71% of the effect of the Israeli versus Palestinian concession framing is due to the influence of this treatment on the perceived fairness of the agreement.¹⁴ The 95% confidence interval around the Fairness mediator's impact on the treatment effect ranges from 34% to 100% of the effect of the treatment. We perform the same analysis to see how fairness judgements mediate the effect of the religious endorsement. We find that fully 86% of the effect is due to the influence of the fairness mediator, with the 95% confidence interval ranging from 51% to 100%.

Discussion

We are hesitant to make predictions about the percentages of the Palestinian population who would support an agreement in different contexts due to the sampling issues described above. We believe the results provide stronger evidence that religious endorsement and framing the outcome as imposed upon Israel would substantially influence Palestinian approval levels. But does this suggest a path to peace?

There may be reason to think that public opinion has been an important factor in the persistence of the conflict. Yasser Arafat, for instance, cited domestic public opinion informed by religious values as a justification for refusing peace proposals that would have divided Jerusalem and given the Palestinians considerable, but not complete, control over the Haram (Indyk 2004, 335; Ross 692-692; Ben Ami 256). This suggests that attention to the specific framing and endorsement of a settlement could be a route to peace.

¹³Causal mediation effects were estimated using the statistical package described in Hicks and Tingley (2011).

¹⁴Sensitivity analysis shows that a substantial violation of the sequential ignorability assumption (see Imai, Keele and Yamamoto (2010) and Imai et al. (2011)) would be necessary for the average causal mediation effect (ACME) to be zero. In particular, the correlation between the error associated with the estimate of the mediator, Fairness, and the error associated with the estimate of Approval must be larger than about 0.7. Graphs of the relationship between the ACMEs and this assumption, with confidence interval estimates, are available in the Online Appendix.

There is also reason to think, however, that structural factors may prevent opinion from changing in the ways that, through agency, our experimental results suggest that it could. The example of Sheik Yassin Al-'Ajlouni discussed at the outset of the paper may be instructive. Shortly after making what appeared to be a sincere religious argument for a Jewish right to pray on the Haram, he retracted his stance. Shortly after that, according to reports, he was arrested by Jordanian authorities.¹⁵ Thus, it may be that questions posed by the experiment - e.g. "How would Palestinian opinion on a peace settlement shift *if* it were endorsed by religious authorities and framed as a negotiating victory for the Palestinian side?" - will always remain counterfactuals. In fact, it may be precisely because of the influence such public stances and framings *could* have that other forces will prevent such public positions from being taken at all.

There are other important caveats to the arguments made above. First, a majority of the Palestinian subjects that we surveyed refused to answer our questions as stated, likely because the issue of Jerusalem is such an emotional one. The results rest on the (demographically representative) minority of subjects that were surveyed who agreed to answer the questions. Further research is thus necessary to replicate and confirm the findings. Second, the findings may be generalizable only insofar as they relate to traditional and/or religious societies and to intractable conflicts. It is likely that more secular publics would not respond similarly to religious cues. Disputes that are not as deeply felt by populations may elicit very different reactions. Fairness and social cues may be interpreted differently in different cultural contexts. Differences of this sort between populations would be consistent, for instance, with psychological studies demonstrating differences in moral reasoning across cultures (e.g. Henrich et al. 2010).

In spite of these caveats, the experimental results appear to indicate that the goods negotiated over in political contexts are not fundamentally, permanently indivisible. Viewed in terms of the specific elements of agreement and disagreement at particular moments, there may be no peaceful, negotiated solution that

¹⁵ The Algemeiner, December 31, 2014, "Jordan Arrests Sheik Who Endorsed Prayer on Temple Mount."

both sides would prefer. But the political framing of a dispute will also strongly influence whether populations on each side would accept the agreement. This presents some grounds for hope. The unfortunate facts are also, however, that the very framings that would make an agreement more acceptable to one side may make it less so to the other. Thus, divisibility does not guarantee the existence of a bargain mutually preferred to conflict.

Conclusion

What are the constituent parts of issue indivisibility? We have argued that two aspects of the political framing of disputes and negotiated solutions are constitutive elements of indivisibility. This implies, however, that the actions of political actors make it so. Certain classes of issues may be more likely to be perceived as indivisible, as Hassner (2009) argues. The preferences of actors would, in such cases, strongly contribute to the persistence of conflict. But where sufficient political agency exists, even apparently fundamental social facts may be changed. As revolutions are said to appear impossible beforehand and inevitable afterwards, solving a long-running conflicts may appear impossible until actors alter taken-for-granted social facts.

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Appendix A: Survey Experiment Text in English

The following questions relate to recent negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Leadership. You will be presented with one of the negotiating points discussed by the parties and asked whether you approve or disapprove of a hypothetical settlement of that issue. The organization conducting this survey is not associated with either of the parties.

During recent negotiations, Israel and the Palestinian National Authority discussed a division of Jerusalem as part of a permanent peace agreement between Israel and a new, sovereign State of Palestine.

Suppose that, according to the latest proposal, Israel will get Jewish neighbourhoods in Jerusalem and Palestine will get Arab neighbourhoods in Jerusalem. In addition, the Old City will be divided in half, with the Christian and Muslim quarters going to Palestine, and the Jewish and Armenian Quarters going to Israel. Israel will retain control of the Western Wall.

In addition, the Palestinian Leadership was able to force Israel to compromise such that there will be divided sovereignty over the Haram al Sharif between Israel and the Palestinians, but there will be a new right of prayer on the Haram for Jews.

Former Mufti Sheikh Ekrima Sa'id Sabri and present Mufti Muhammad Ahmad Hussein are both ready to accept this solution.

Questions:

- 1. If the Palestinian leadership accepted this agreement, would you
- a) strongly approve
- b) approve
- c) neither approve nor disapprove
- d) disapprove
- e) strongly disapprove
- 2. In your view, this agreement is
- a) Totally fair
- b) Mostly fair
- c) Somewhat fair
- d) Neither fair nor unfair
- e) Somewhat unfair
- f) Mostly unfair
- g) Totally unfair
- 3. Demographic questions: Gender, Age, Education Level, Religion, Degree of Religiosity.

Appendix B: Survey Experiment Text in Arabic

التصميم النهائى:

النص (3 ج) – تنازل إسرائيلي / ليس نصّ موافقة - يقدّم هذا النصّ ل (15 %) من المستطلعة آراؤهم في كلّ منطقة تُستطلع آراؤها:

الأسئلة التالية تتعلق بالمفاوضات الحديثة ما بين إسرائيل والقيادة الفلسطينية. سوف نطرح على حضرتكم واحدة من النقاط التي يقوم الطرفان بالتفاوض عليها حالياً ونسألكم إذا كنتم **تعارضون** أم **تؤيدون** تسوية إفتر اضية لتلك المسألة. يرجى الملاحظة أن هذه الدر اسة ليست لها علاقة بأي من الطرفين.

خلال المفاوضات الحديثة، ناقشت إسر ائيل والسلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية موضوع

"تقسيم القدس كجزء من إتفاقية سلام دائمة ما بين إسر ائيل ودولة فلسطينية جديدة ذات سيادة"

بحيث ينص الاقتراح على ما يلي: (1) إسرائيل ستحصل على الأحياء اليهودية في القدس (2) فلسطين ستحصل على الأحياء العربية في القدس. (3) إضافة إلى ذلك، سيتم تقسيم البلدة القديمة إلى نصفين، بحيث يذهب الحي الإسلامي وحارة النصارى إلى فلسطين، بينما يذهب الحي اليهودي وحارة الأرمن إلى إسرائيل. إسرائيل ستحتفظ بسيطرتها على حائط المبكى. (4) أضف إلى ذلك، كانت القيادة الفلسطينية قادرة ً على إجبار إسرائيل على التنازل بحيث يتم تقسيم السيادة على الحرم الشريف ما بين إسرائيل والفلسطينيين، ولكن سيكون هناك لليهود حق جديد للصلاة على ساحة الحرم الشريف .

الأس<u>ئا</u>ة:

معالجة الموافقة:

	نية بهذا الإتفاق، فهل:	1. إذا قبلت القيادة الفلسطيا
3) لا تؤيد ولا تعترض	2) ستؤيد	1) ستؤيد بشدة
	5) تعترض بشدة	4) تعترض

2. في نظرك، هل هذه الإتفاقية:

3) عادلة إلى حد ما	2) عادلة إلى حدّ كبير	1) عادلة تماما
6) ظالمة إلى حدّ كبير	5) ظالمة إلى حد ما	4) لا عادلة ولا ظالمة
		7) ظالمة تماماً

3. هل توافق بأن إتفاقية مثل هذه يجب النظر بها لأسباب عملية، بغض النظر عن كونها عادلة أم لا؟

3) لا أوافق ولا أعترض	2) أوافق إلى حدّ ما	1) أوافق بشدة
	5) أعترض بشدة	4) أعترض إلى حدّ ما

	3) لا تؤيده ولا تعارضه	بهذا الإتفاق، فهل: 2) ستؤيده 5) تعارضيه بشدة	 4. إذا قبلت أغلبية الشعب الفلسطيني 1) ستؤيده بشدة 4) تعارضه
	(اختر إجابة منهما)	-	1_5. في السيناريو أعلاه، وُصف الإن (١) إسرائيل،
	(اختر إجابة منهما).		2_5. في السيناريو أعلاه، تم قبول الا (١) السلطات الدينية،
			6. أسئلة ديمغرافية:
		2) أنثى	أ. ا لجنس: 1) ذكر
	3) من 36 لغاية 45	2) من 26 لغاية 35 5) من 56 فما فوق	ب. العمر: 1) من 18 لغاية 25 4) من 46 لغاية 55
	العا	2) المرحلة الثانويّة أو ما يعاد 4) يحمل شهادة جامعيّة.	ج. المستوى التعليمي: 1) لم يتمّم المرحلة الثانوية 3) خريج كليّة أو معهد
	3) غير ذلك	2) مىيىچى	د. الدیانة: 1) مسلم
4) متديّن جدّا	3) متديّن	2) نقليدي	 ه. التديّن: 1) غير منديّن

Appendix C: Survey Demographics

	Correctly Perceiving Sample			Attempted Interviews	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Difference
Gender					
Female	194	50.52	525	49.81	-0.71
Male	190	49.48	529	50.19	0.71
Level of Religiosity					
Not religious	11	2.86	35	3.32	0.46
Religious	187	48.70	575	54.55	5.86
Traditional	162	42.19	387	36.72	-5.47
Very religious	24	6.25	57	5.41	-0.84
Religion					
Christian	5	1.30	22	2.09	0.79
Muslim	379	98.70	1032	97.91	-0.79
Education					
College graduate Did not complete high	45	11.72	115	10.91	-0.81
school	170	44.27	476	45.16	0.89
Graduate degree	61	15.89	179	16.98	1.10
High school or equivalent	108	28.13	284	26.94	-1.18
Age					
18 to 25	133	34.64	365	34.63	-0.01
25 to 35	104	27.08	279	26.47	-0.61
35 to 45	66	17.19	187	17.74	0.55
45 to 55	49	12.76	125	11.86	-0.90
55 or older	32	8.33	98	9.30	0.96